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Abstract 
A prescriptive and performance-based fire and life safety evaluation for Christopher Cohan 
Center is performed. The results and findings of the evaluations are conveyed in this report. 
Christopher Cohan Center was built in accordance with California Building Code (1992 
Edition) and California Fire Code (1992 Edition). The current version (2015) of International 
Building Code is consulted for prescriptive evaluation. The protection requirements set forth in 
IBC are intended to limit the threat from stage fires to an audience, to reduce the likelihood of a 
large fire in the stage area and to reduce the possibility of irrational mass response. These 
objectives have been identified as primary parameters to evaluate the fire and life safety systems 
of the building.  
Christopher Cohan Center was constructed of Type IB construction with a sprinkler 
system throughout the building. Legitimate stage is completely separated from seating by a 
proscenium wall of 2-hour fire-rated construction with the main proscenium opening protected 
by an automatic closing fire protection curtain in accordance with IBC 410.3.5. A wet pipe, 
hydraulically calculated automatic sprinkler system is provided throughout the building. A 
hydraulic calculation was performed in accordance with NFPA 13, which shows that, the city 
water supply is not adequate for the sprinkler system and hose stream demands. The main exit of 
the Sydney Harman Hall accommodates a total occupant load of 1,440, which is more than the 
total occupant load of the hall, 1,289. This arrangement complies with IBC section 1029.2. In 
addition to having access to a main exit, Christopher Cohan Center is provided with additional 
exits from the balcony level, gallery level, orchestra stage, and entry lobby. These exits provide 
an egress capacity of 5,280 persons from orchestra stage and entry lobby levels and 960 persons 
from balcony and gallery levels, which are more than the total occupant loads served by an 
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individual level. In the event of an alarm, Christopher Cohan Center Ushers are required to assist 
in the evacuation process.  
A fast-growing fire is modeled in FDS, which shows activation of gravity vents between 
349 and 436 seconds, fire protection curtain activation at 440 s, and first sprinkler activation at 
498 second after ignition. The tenability criterion is established to be the smoke layer descend 
within 2 m. above any means of egress. This criterion is predicted to occur at 210 s. in the zone 
model. FDS model does not predict smoke layer to descend within 2 m. above any means of 
egress, within the simulation time (570 s.).  FDS model also shows that, the proscenium structure 
can contain the smoke until 300 s. FDS predicts the smoke detector will activate at 274 second. 
The notification of the fire event is expected to be triggered by the rapid descend of smoke layer, 
possibly shading or obscuring lighting effects dropped from the grid-iron, or by occupants, 
present in the fly gallery, sensing the presence of smoke, can initiate the notification of the fire 
event by activating manual fire alarm, long before the automatic detection devices detect the fire 
cues and initiate activation of the fire alarm.  
Based on the evaluation of the building and stage construction, the stage construction and 
fire separation play key-role in limiting the threat from a stage-fire to the audience due to its 
containment of smoke long enough for the audience to evacuate the hall. It can also be confirmed 
that the installed systems will not perform to meet the performance criteria. The building would 
be relying on human actions to detect fire, to annunciate, and to suppress the fire. To reduce the 
likelihood of a large fire in the stage area human intervention would be a crucial factor. Also, the 
collective effort of the egress system and human-assistance play a crucial role in evacuation 
process, which contributes to ensure minimal exposure to the fire environment. Due to effective 
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evacuation and egress system, the possibility of irrational mass response is expected to be 
minimal. 
Recommendations include the incorporation of a fire pump based on the hydraulic 
demand for the most challenging design area. Proper inspection, testing and maintenance of the 
suppression systems is required, in accordance with specified standards. Additional requirements 
specified in the fire safety management plan must be included in the ‘Emergency Management 
Plan’ for Christopher Cohan Center. This includes engaging dedicated fire watch personnel and 
crowd managers during events, and incorporating specified employee training and response 
procedures along with all the emergency management procedures that are currently in place.    
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Fire and Life Safety Evaluation of Christopher Cohan Center 
A comprehensive fire and life safety evaluation for Christopher Cohan Center is 
performed. Relevant fire safety codes, standards and regulations are identified, the fire safety 
performance objectives and criteria associated with these documents are comprehended, and 
these fire safety objectives and criteria are applied on the evaluation process. Construction, 
egress systems, smoke management systems, fire detection and alarm systems and fire 
suppression systems are analyzed to achieve specified performance objectives. The flammability 
characteristics of ignitable materials used to create sets and sceneries are analyzed and the fire 
hazards associated with these materials are evaluated. The dynamics of fires inside the building 
is analyzed through the application of fundamental principles and state-of-the-art computer based 
fire simulation models. How people interact with fire conditions in the building is discussed and 
evacuation times are calculated through the application of fundamental principles of people 
movement and state-of-the-art computer-based evacuation model. The results and findings of fire 
and life safety evaluations for the building are conveyed in this report. 
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General Building Information 
Widely known as the Performing Arts Center, San Luis Obispo is a state-of-the-art 
performance facility located on the campus of California Polytechnic State University (Cal 
Poly). Open since September of 1996, the Performing Arts Center incorporates two main venues: 
The Christopher Cohan Center, including the majestic 1,289-seat Sidney Harman Hall, the 180-
seat classroom Philips Hall, and the multi-purpose Pavilion that holds various capacities up to 
453 people; and the 498-seat Davidson Music Center. The Christopher Cohan Center is a three-
story assembly building with a legitimate stage theatre. It was constructed immediately adjacent 
to a portion of Davidson Music Center. This report only evaluates Christopher Cohan Center and 
excludes Davidson Music Center from evaluation. Figure 1 shows the external view of the 
building. Table 1 and 2 describes different occupancies in the building and floor usage at 
different levels.    
Number of stories below / above grade: 1 / 3  
Highest occupied floor level / height: Gallery level / 39 ft. 
Date of construction: 1996 
 
Figure 1. View of Christopher Cohan Center from Grand Avenue. 
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Occupancy Classification: 
Table 1. Occupancies Classifications of Christopher Cohan Center 
Occupancy Classification  Occupant Load 
1. Legitimate theatre Group A-1 1714 
2. Classroom Group A-3 180 
3. Office Spaces Group B 83 
4. Multipurpose Pavilion Group A-3 453 
5. Lobbies Group A-3 683 
6. Storage Group S-2 8 
 
Table 2. Usage and occupant loads per floor. 
Floor Use Occupant Load 
Trap Room – Lift Pit Level Stage, Storage, Equipment 
rooms. 
224 
Orchestra – Stage Level Main hall, Loggias, Piano, 
Stage, Food-handling, Green 
room, Dressing rooms, 
Offices, Storages, Laundry, 
Classroom, Rehearsal 
Pavilion.    
1885 
Main Entry Level Lobby, Dress-circle, 
Concession, Office.  
602 
Balcony Level Balcony, Lounge, Lobby 463 
Gallery Level Gallery 155 
Catwalk Level Gridiron, Catwalk 36 
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Fire and Life Safety Objectives and Criteria 
 In this section, relevant fire safety codes, standards and regulations are identified that 
specify the fire and life safety objectives and criteria that Christopher Cohan Center is expected 
to perform.  
Fire safety codes, standards and regulations 
Below is a list of major standards listed in the construction document that were used for 
fire and life safety design of Christopher Cohan Center.  
1. Title 24, Part 2; California Building Code (1992 Edition) 
2. Title 24, Part 9, California Fire Code (1992 Edition) 
Current version (2015) of International Building Code is consulted to identify relevant 
codes applicable to Christopher Cohan Center. 
IBC Chapter 4: Special detailed requirements based on use and occupancy 
The protection requirements set forth in section 410 are intended to limit the threat from 
stage fires to an audience and reduce the likelihood of a large fire in the stage area. These 
provisions include construction restrictions, automatic sprinkler systems, ventilation, separation 
of the stage from the audience and compartmentalization of appurtenant rooms to the stage. 
Special allowances are provided for galleries, gridirons, catwalks and other technical 
production areas. Based on historical events and the expertise of a broad range of professionals 
with experience in theater design, operations and fire events, a set of principles guides the 
requirements for theaters. These principles are summarized as follows: 
1. The fire hazards of stages are not necessarily a function of type but rather area and 
height. Accordingly, the stage area of 4,000 square feet and a height of 80 feet represents a 
significant potential for fuel load due to scenery and drops. 
FIRE AND LIFE SAFETY EVALUATION OF CHRISTOPHER COHAN CENTER 15 
2. The stages requires a means of emergency ventilation. 
3. The stages requires automatic sprinkler protection. 
4. The stage is like floor construction; therefore, the type of construction should be 
consistent with that of the floor construction in the building. 
5. Separation of the stage from the seating area, dressing rooms and similar spaces is 
critical to provide a degree of fire containment. 
Section 410.3 contains provisions for the construction of the stage and gallery. Stage 
openings, decorations, equipment and scenery are addressed in Sections 410.3.3 through 410.3.6. 
Stage ventilation is required in accordance with Section 410.3.7. The construction of auxiliary 
stage spaces is addressed in Section 410.5. Special means of egress requirements for the stage 
and technical production areas are established in Section 410.6. Sections 410.7 and 410.8 contain 
the requirements for automatic sprinkler systems and standpipes, respectively. 
IBC Chapter 5: General building heights and areas.  
Table 3 shows an extraction from IBC Table 504.3, which provides limitations on the 
height, in feet, based on the occupancy classification, type of construction (IB) and equipment of 
sprinkler system. The height in feet is the distance from grade plane to the average height of the 
highest roof surface. The building is Occupancy Classification A-1.  
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Table 3. IBC Table 504.3 showing height allowances based on occupancy and type of construction. 
 
Table 4 shows an extraction from IBC table 504.4, which provides height limitations, in 
stories, based upon the occupancy classification, the type of construction, and equipment with 
the automatic sprinkler system. The height is in number of stories above grade plane. 
Table 4. IBC Table 504.4 showing allowable number of stories based on occupancy and type of construction. 
 
IBC ection 506.2.3 provides no limitations on the area of Christopher Cohan Center 
based on occupancy classification A-1, type of construction IB and equipment with a sprinkler 
system throughout. 
IBC Chapter 9: Fire protection systems 
Because of the potentially large fuel load and three-dimensional aspect of the fire hazard 
associated with the stage which is 4,000 square feet in area, Class II standpipes are required on 
each side of the stage. The IBC section 905.3.4 exception recognizes the benefit of Christopher 
Cohan Center being sprinklered. So, only a single 11
2
-inch standpipe connection is required. This 
hose connection is intended to be used by the fire department and apply less water from the hose 
because of the suppression activity of the sprinkler system. Hose threads are required to be 
compatible with those of the fire department as required in IBC Section 903.3.6. 
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In a fully sprinklered building it is acceptable to supply the hose connections through the 
same standpipe as the sprinklers, which is reflected in the reference to both NFPA 13, which 
acknowledges this concept, and NFPA 14, which contains similar provisions. Although the 
standpipe is wet and Class II in its installation, the design of the water supply and 
interconnection of systems is required to be in accordance with the requirements for Class II as 
well as for Class III standpipes.  
Christopher Cohan Center is typically occupied by a significant number of people who 
are not completely familiar with their surroundings. The provisions of International Building 
Code section 907.2.1 addresses situations regarding the application of the alarm requirements 
which applies for this building. 
The exception specified on 907.2.1 allows the omission of manual fire alarm boxes in 
Christopher Cohan Center, which is equipped throughout with automatic sprinkler system. 
Activation of the sprinkler system will activate the building evacuation alarms associated with 
the manual fire alarm system. 
The exception does not eliminate the fire alarm system and occupant notification system, 
but rather permits them to be initiated automatically by the sprinkler water flow switches instead 
of by the manual fire alarm boxes. It also reduces the possibility of mischievous or malicious 
false alarms being turned on by manual fire alarm boxes in Christopher Cohan Center where 
large numbers of people congregate. 
To afford authorized personnel, the ability to selectively evacuate or manage occupant 
relocation, IBC section 907.2.1.1 requires the fire alarm system to operate through an emergency 
voice/alarm communications system. The exception allows the automatic alarm signals to be 
overridden for live voice instructions if the live voice instructions do not exceed 3 minutes. The 
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location from which the live voice announcement originates must be constantly attended and 
approved by the fire code official. In terms of the applicability of this section, it is not as specific 
as Section 907.2.1. More specifically, the concept of fire areas does not apply to this code. 
IBC Chapter 10: Means of Egress 
Sydney Harman Hall, Philips Hall, Rehearsal Pavilion and adjacent lobby areas are used 
for assembly purposes and contain elements that would affect the path of travel for the means of 
egress. These spaces require special consideration because of the larger occupant loads and 
possible low lighting, which can possibly lead to slower fire recognition and crowd concerns. 
Sections 1029.2 through 1029.5 deal with number and dispersement of exits. Christopher 
Cohan Center, just as any assembly space presents unusual life safety problems that includes 
frequent higher occupant densities and, therefore, large occupant loads and the opportunity for 
irrational mass response to a perceived emergency. For this reason, the code requires a specific 
arrangement of the exits. Studies have indicated that in any emergency, occupants will tend to 
egress via the same path of travel used to enter the hall and building. Therefore, a main entrance 
to the building is required to be designed as the main exit to accommodate this behavior, even if 
the required exit capacity might be more easily accommodated elsewhere. The main entrance 
must be sized to accommodate at least 50 percent of the total occupant load of the structure and 
is required to front on a large, open space, such as a street, for rapid dispersal of the occupants 
outside the building or hall. The remaining exits must also accommodate at least 50 percent of 
the total occupant load from each level. The total occupant load includes those within the theater 
seating area, the lobby and other spaces. 
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In Christopher Cohan Center, people might arrive and wait for the next show while 
another group has yet to exit. In every case, the main entrance and all other exits are to be 
constantly available for the entire building occupant load. 
Because of the queuing of large crowds, particularly in Sydney Harman Hall where a 
performance may be in progress and people must wait to attend the next one, standing space is 
provided. For reasons of safety, these spaces should not interfere with established paths of egress 
from the assembly areas. While the facility might choose to separate the route for means of 
egress using partitions or railings from the general lobby space to allow for easy traffic flow 
through the lobby to the street, it is not required to designate these areas.  
Section 1029.5 states the threshold where two means of egress are required based on the 
occupant load of the interior balcony and gallery. This requirement would ensure that at least one 
path of travel is always available and occupants face a minimum number of hazards.  
The means of egress width for spaces used for assembly is to be in accordance with 
section 1029.6 and the referenced sections instead of the criteria specified in Section 1005 when 
dealing with the means of egress within the seating area. The width factors in Section 1029.6 and 
its subsections apply to those doorways, passageways, stepped aisles, ramped aisles and level 
aisles that are within the assembly seating areas. 
The Board for the Coordination of Model Codes (BCMC) issued a report on means of 
egress dated June 10, 1985. The provisions in Section 1029 are based on this report. This report 
limits the application of these provisions to aisles and aisle access ways that provide exit access 
within the room or space with the assembly seating. The primary concern for occupant safety 
would be that where the different provisions for the capacity requirements in Sections 1005 and 
1029 were utilized, there would not be a bottleneck in the path of travel for means of egress. In 
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Sydney Harman Hall, commonly the occupants leave the seating area for a concourse or lobby 
area that leads to exit stairways between floor levels. In this situation, the capacity requirement 
in Section 1005.3 would be applicable for the exit stairway. 
Different means of egress width criteria are also specified for assembly seating where 
smoke protection is provided versus areas where smoke protection is not provided. The egress 
width for smoke-protected seating can be less than for areas where smoke protection is not 
provided, since the smoke level is required to be maintained at least 6 feet above the floor of the 
means of egress, per Section 1029.6.2.1. 
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Application of codes at Christopher Cohan Center 
In this section, structural fire protection, egress systems, fire suppression systems, fire 
detection and alarm systems and smoke management systems of Christopher Cohan Center 
analyzed to evaluate the performances. 
Construction.  
Christopher Cohan Center is constructed of Type IB construction with sprinkler system. 
The building is constructed to a height above grade plane of 90 feet. The building is constructed 
to height of three stories above grade plane. The building is Occupancy Classification A-1. 
The area of each floor is as follows: 
Floor Square Footage 
Orchestra Pit 1,898 s.f. 
Basement Level 5,325 s.f.  
Electrical Room / Chillers 1,645 s.f. 
Orchestra Stage Level 42,979 s.f. 
Entry Lobby Level 18,517 s.f. 
Balcony Level 13,045 s.f. 
Gallery Level 7,672 s.f. 
Catwalk Level 357 s.f. 
Total 91,438 s.f. 
  Typical floors are of 2-hour fire-resistive construction. The finish floor of the stage is of 
wood on a resilient mounting upon heavy timbers (Figure 2). Section 410.3 permits, in all types 
of construction, the finished floor of the stage can be constructed of wood or approved 
noncombustible materials. 
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Figure 2. Stage floor construction 
Exterior Walls 
Exterior load bearing walls throughout the structure are 4-hour fire resistive construction. 
Exterior load bearing walls fronting on Tahoe Road, Grand Avenue and the Service Yard have 
unprotected openings. 
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The exterior wall of the Davidson Music Center immediately adjacent to the Christopher 
Cohan Center is of 4-hour fire-resistive construction (10” concrete) with no openings. This wall, 
which includes a minimum 30-inch parapet, is serves as an area separation wall from the 
building. 
Exterior non-bearing walls fronting on Tahoe Road, Grand Avenue and the Service Yard 
are of non-combustible, non-fire-rated construction with unprotected openings. 
The exterior wall opposite the metal canopy on the Davidson Music Center is of 4-hour 
fire-resistive construction. No openings are provided in this wall. 
Fire-resistive separations.   
Stage to accessory rooms such as dressing rooms and store rooms are separated by 2-hour 
construction and 90-minute fire rated doors in accordance with IBC Section 410.5 (Figure 3). 
Legitimate stage is completely separated from seating by a proscenium wall of 2-hour fire-rated 
construction. In addition to the main proscenium opening, there is one opening at the orchestra 
pit level and two openings into the seating area at the stage floor level. Except the main 
proscenium opening, all openings in the proscenium wall of the legitimate stage is protected by 
fire assemblies having ratings of 11
2
 hours which meets the criteria specified in IBC 410.3.4. The 
main proscenium opening has an automatic closing fire protection curtain in accordance with 
IBC 410.3.5. 
Interior load bearing walls of Christopher Cohan Center are made of 2-hr fire rated walls. 
Opening in the walls are protected by 90-minute fire rated assemblies. These interior load 
bearing wall assemblies divide the building in six (6) separate ‘fire areas’ (Figure 4).  
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Figure 3. Fire resistive separation used to separate stage from adjacent spaces. 
 
Figure 4. Orchestra Stage level plan showing different fire areas. 
Structural Frame 
Columns and the girders, beams, trusses and spandrels having direct connections to the 
columns and all other members essential to the building stability are of 2-hour fire-resistive 
construction. Floor members and roof panels which have no connection to the columns are 
considered secondary members. 
The construction of Christopher Cohan Center and its legitimate stage was built to meet 
the prescriptive requirements and in some cases, exceed the minimum requirements with liberal 
margin of safety. The stage and proscenium plays an important role in limiting threat from stage-
Proscenium opening 
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fire to the audience due to its containment of smoke and heat long enough for the audience to 
evacuate the hall. In ‘Predicting Behavior of Fire in the Stage’ section, this criterion is evaluated 
to understand the comprehensive performance of the building structure along with emergency 
ventilation and fire protection curtain systems.   
Egress  
The main exit of the Sydney Harman Hall accommodates total occupant load of 1,440, 
which is more than the total occupant load of the hall which is 1,289 complying with IBC section 
1029.2 (Figure 6). 
IBC Section 1029.3 requires, in addition to having access to a main exit, each level of 
Christopher Cohan Center, shall be provided with additional means of egress that shall provide 
an egress capacity for not less than one-half of the total occupant load served by that level and 
shall comply with section 1007.1. In addition to having access to a main exit, Christopher Cohan 
Center is provided with additional exit stairs from balcony and gallery levels and additional exits 
from orchestra stage and entry lobby levels that provides egress capacity of 5,280 persons from 
orchestra stage and entry lobby levels and 960 persons from balcony and gallery levels which are 
more than the total occupant loads served by individual level (Figure 5 and 7).  
North side of the legitimate stage have three marked exits. There are two exits on the 
south side and one on the east side. These exits open directly to exit passageways leading to 
public ways. Section 410.6 requires, no fewer than one exit or exit access doorway shall be 
provided on each side of the stage. 
Both balcony and gallery have two exits which leads directly to enclosed exit stairs. 
Section 1029.5 requires, for balconies and galleries having seating capacities of 50 or more used 
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for assembly purposes, not less than two means of egress shall be provided, with one from each 
side. 
 
Figure 5. Orchestra stage level plan showing means of egress from assembly areas and stage. 
 
Figure 6. Entry lobby level plan showing the main exit and additional exits. 
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Figure 7. Balcony level plan showing the location of enclosed exits stairs connected directly to the balcony and gallery level. 
Egress from the Orchestra pit level is provided by two (2) 48 in. wide exit stairs. Egress 
from the Orchestra – Stage level is provided by four (4) exit access stairs (one (1) 86 in., one (1) 
89 in. and two (2) 148 in.) and seven (7) exits. Egress from the Entry lobby level is provided by 
three (3) exit stairs (two (2) 48 in., one (1) 73 in.) and six (6) exits. Egress from Balcony and 
Gallery level is provided by three (3) exit stairs (two (2) 48 in., one (1) 73 in.) and two exit 
access stairs of 72 in. each. The floor to floor height of the floors served by the stairs is 13 ft. 
There are 36 in. clear width doors at south stairway entrances and a 75.6 in. wide exit discharge. 
There are 36 in. wide doors at entrances to north exit stairs and 92 in. and 72 in. wide doors at 
exit discharge from North West and north east exit stairs respectively.  
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Occupant load and exit capacity calculations 
Table 5. Occupant loads and exit capacities of each level. 
 
Floor Spaces Use
Occupant 
Load Factor 
(sq. ft. per 
person) *
Area 
(sq. ft.)
Occupant 
Load on 
each space
Total 
width of 
egress 
(in.)
Capacity 
Factor 
(in./ 
person) 
**
Exit 
Capacity 
(person) 
= Total 
width of 
egress / 
Capacity 
Factor
Occupant 
load per 
floor
Total 
number 
of exits
Total 
width of 
egress 
(in.)
Exit 
Capacity*
**
11 Storage Area 300 3270 11 168 0.2 840
12 Storage Area 300 236 1 36 0.2 180
012A Storage Area 300 97 0 36 0.2 180
13 Storage Area 300 86 0 36 0.2 180
14 Equipment Room 300 403 1 36 0.2 180
15 Equipment Room 300 99 0 72 0.2 360
16 Equipment Room 300 74 0 36 0.2 180
17 Equipment Room 300 421 1 72 0.2 360
18 Equipment Room 300 671 2 84 0.2 420
19 Equipment Room 300 393 1 72 0.2 360
96 33019
Trap room 
Lift Pit level
2
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Lounge and 
galleries Circulation Number of f  5095
390 in. 
stair 
and 72 
in. door
0.2 and 
LSC 
7.3.3.2 1984
Main Hall Fixed Seating
Number of 
fixed seats 878 878 354 0.2 1770
101A Stage 15 166 11 72 0.2 360
Loggia East Fixed Seating
Number of 
fixed seats 9 9 45 LSC 7.3.3.2 151
Loggia 
West Fixed Seating
Number of 
fixed seats 10 10 45 LSC 7.3.3.2 151
Piano Stage 15 172 11 72 0.2 360
Stage Stage 15 4049 270 180 0.2 900
104 Equipment Room 300 95 0 36 0.2 180
105 Business 100 63 1 36 0.2 180
106 Business 100 724 7 36 0.2 180
Food 
Handling Business 100 653 7 36 0.2 180
Green 
Room Business 100 513 5 36 0.2 180
Dressing 
Room 110 Business 100 171 2 36 0.2 180
Dressing 
Room 111 Business 100 149 1 36 0.2 180
Technical 
Services 
Manager Business 100 107 1 36 0.2 180
House 
Production 
Office Business 100 198 2 36 0.2 180
House 
Storage 114 Storage 500 453 1 96 0.2 480
Dressing 
Room 115 Business 100 257 3 36 0.2 180
Laundry 
Room Equipment Room 300 609 2 192 0.2 960
Dressing 
Room 117 Business 100 679 7 36 0.2 180
Dressing 
Room 118 Business 100 393 4 36 0.2 180
Dressing 
Room 119 Business 100 393 4 36 0.2 180
Dressing 
Room 120 Business 100 678 7 36 0.2 180
Dressing 
Room 121 Business 100 192 2 36 0.2 180
House 
Storage 122 Storage 500 586 1 96 0.2 480
123 Business 100 41 0 36 0.2 180
Classroom Fixed Seating
Number of 
fixed seats 180 180 108 0.2 540
124B Equipment Room 300 339 1 168 0.2 840
127 Business 100 59 1 36 0.2 180
Rehearsal 
Pavillion
Concentrated 
use, without 
fixed seating 7 3179 454 140 0.2 700
129 Storage 500 39 0 36 0.2 180
130 Equipment Room 300 53 0 36 0.2 180
131 Business 100 60 1 36 0.2 180
131A Business 100 62 1 36 0.2 180
244 in. 
doors 
and 622 
in. stairs
37971883
Orchestra 
Stage Level
11
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Each floor has an adequate number of exits with sufficient exit capacity based on 
occupant load (Table 5).  
Number and arrangement of means of egress 
Table 6 has been extracted from LSC Table A.7.6, which provides us with the values of 
allowable common path, dead-end and travel distances limits by occupancy.  
Lobby Waiting Space 15 8889 593 657 0.2 3285
Balcony 
Left Fixed Seating
Number of 
fixed seats 17 17 36 0.2 180
Royal Box Fixed Seating
Number of 
fixed seats 17 17 36 0.2 180
Concession Business 100 263 3 36 0.2 180
Main 
Communica
tions Room Business 100 341 3 36 0.2 180
Reception / 
Manager / 
Box Office Business 100 1014 10 108 0.2 540
657 in. 
doors 
and 169 
in. stairs
3895643
Entry Lobby 
Level
9
Lower 
Balcony Fixed Seating
Number of 
fixed seats 138 138 144 0 720
Control and 
Sound 
Room Business 100 669 7 36 0.2 180
303 Storage 500 78 0 36 0.2 180
Founder's 
Lounge
Less 
concentrated 
use, without 
fixed seating 15 662 44 144 0.2 720
307 Storage 500 122 0 36 0.2 180
308 Business 100 287 3 36 0.2 180
309 Storage 500 144 0 36 0.2 180
310 Business 100 290 3 72 0.2 360
311 Storage 500 121 0 36 0.2 180
312 Storage 500 876 2 48
LSC 
7.3.3.2 165
314 Storage 500 28 0 36 0.2 180
293 1123197
Balcony 
Level
4
Gallery Fixed Seating
Number of 
fixed seats 152 152 144 0.2 720
402 Equipment Room 300 355 1 36 0.2 180
403 Storage 500 79 0 36 0.2 180
404 Storage 500 123 0 36 0.2 180
405 Equipment Room 300 293 1 36 0.2 180
406 Equipment Room 300 347 1 36 0.2 180
* Occupant load factor is selected based on LSC Table 7.3.1.2
** Capacity factor is selected based on LSC Table 7.3.3.1
*** As all the stairs are wider than 44 in. and subject to the 0.3 in. (7.6 mm) width per person capacity factor, the 
capacity is increased using the equation provided in LSC 7.3.3.2
300 1100156Gallery Level 5
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Table 6. Common paths of travel, dead-end and travel distance allowances per the Life Safety Code. 
 
The cases of highest travel distances on each floor are demonstrated on the figures below.  
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Figure 8. Plan of the lift pit level showing highest travel distance scenario 
 The highest travel distance is found on room 011. The highest travel distance is 80 ft. 
which is below the allowable travel distance limit of 250 ft. for sprinklered Assembly 
occupancies (Figure 8).  
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Figure 9. Highest travel distance scenario in the Sydney Harman hall 
  The highest travel distance scenario at the Sydney Harman Hall is 70 ft., which is below 
the allowable travel distance limit of 250 ft. for sprinklered Assembly occupancies (Figure 9).  
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Figure 10. The highest travel distance scenario at the Dress circle 
  The highest travel distance at the Dress Circle is 59 ft., which is below the allowable 
travel distance limit of 250 ft. for sprinklered Assembly occupancies (Figure 10).  
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Figure 11. Highest travel distance at the balcony level 
Highest travel distance at the Balcony level is 66 ft., which is below the allowable travel 
distance limit of 250 ft. for sprinklered Assembly occupancies (Figure 11). 
FIRE AND LIFE SAFETY EVALUATION OF CHRISTOPHER COHAN CENTER 36 
 
Figure 12. Highest travel distance scenario at the Gallery level 
Highest travel distance at the Gallery level is 64 ft., which is below the allowable travel 
distance limit of 250 ft. for sprinklered Assembly occupancies (Figure 12). 
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All exits, except the North-east exit stair, discharged to the exterior of the building. The 
South stair on all floors is open due to unenclosed stairwell. All other exit stairs are provided 
with 90-min fire-rated doors. 
Common paths of travel and dead ends are not present in the building. Exit access 
corridors are provided with the proper fire protection and fire separation. Emergency evacuation 
plans and occupant load signs are located adjacent to the exits. Stair designation signs are 
provided inside the exit stairs. 
The egress system meets the prescriptive requirements of IBC. The collective role of 
egress system along with the evacuation agents still requires a performance-based analysis to be 
performed, which is discussed in the Evacuation section in the later part of the report.  
Suppression 
A wet pipe, hydraulically calculated automatic sprinkler system is provided throughout 
Christopher Cohan Center. Offices and auditorium seating areas are classified as Light Hazard 
Occupancies. System covering these areas are designed with a density of 0.1 gpm/square foot 
over the most remote 1,500 square feet. Coverage per sprinkler does not exceed 225 square feet. 
Storage areas, kitchen and mechanical equipment areas are classified as Ordinary Hazard Group 
1. Systems covering these areas are designed with a density of 0.15 gpm/square foot over the 
most remote 1,500 square feet. Coverage per sprinkler does not exceed 130 square feet in area. 
Stage and orchestra pit is classified as Ordinary Hazard, Group 2. Systems covering these areas 
are designed with a density of 0.2 gpm/square foot over the most remote 1,500 square feet. 
Coverage per sprinkler does not exceed 130 square feet in area. The hazard classification, design 
density and coverage meets the requirements of NFPA 13.   
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Water Supply Analysis 
For Christopher Cohan Center, city water main is the only water supply serving the fire 
suppression systems installed in the building. The static pressure was 130 psi; residual pressure 
was 60 psi at a flow of 1100 gpm at the point of connection to the water supply system, per the 
flow test information that was conducted on November 9, 1994. This flow test was conducted at 
the water hydrant located at Tahoe road.  
Sprinkler system calculations 
Per the occupancy classification provided in NFPA 13, different parts of the building are 
classified as Light hazard, Ordinary hazard Group 1 and Group 2. Per NFPA 13 section 5.3.2.1, 
ordinary hazard (Group 2) occupancies shall be defined as occupancies or portions of other 
occupancies where the quantity and combustibility of contents are moderate to high, and fires 
with moderate to high rates of heat release are expected. Examples of ordinary hazard (group 2) 
are cereal mills, distilleries, dry cleaners, feed mills, horse stables, mercantile areas, post offices 
and repair garages. The assessment of the quantity and combustibility of the contents and 
expected rates of heat release warrants the stage to be classified as an Ordinary Hazard Group 2. 
Per section 11.2.3.2.1.2, calculations shall satisfy any single point on the appropriate density / 
area curve (Figure 13). Due to the higher density requirements for the sprinklers protecting the 
stage, the required flow and pressure on the system is determined by the flow and pressure 
calculated for the most remote heads, which are located 81 feet above the stage (node 1-17 of 
Figure 14).  
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Figure 13. Density/Area Curves for different hazard groups. 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 (𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠)  =  𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 
𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 1500 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 
Per NFPA 13 section 23.4.4.1.1.1, for density/area method, design area shall be a 
rectangular area with the dimension parallel to the branch lines (BL) at least 1.2 times the square 
root of the area of sprinkler operation (A) used, for A = 1500 sq. ft., L > 46.48 ft. As sprinklers 
are 11.25 ft. apart, five (5) sprinklers are required along each BL. But each BL contains four (4) 
sprinklers. So, all four (4) sprinklers along the BLs are incorporated in the calculation area. Four 
(4) BLs cover an area of 1375.31 sq. ft.   
Note that the design area is not a perfect rectangle. The 1500 sq. ft. requirement can be 
met with an additional sprinkler on the fifth BL, so there is no need to include the additional 
three (3) sprinklers of the fifth BL (Figure 14).  
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Figure 14. Sprinkler layout at Grid-iron level showing hydraulic nodes 1 - 90. 
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Figure 15. Orchestra stage level plan showing hydraulic calculation nodes 91 - 100. 
Node Analysis. Flow and pressure at the most remote sprinkler can be determined by 
𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹,𝑄𝑄 (𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁) = 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 0.2𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁
𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
∗ 112 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 22.4 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁.  
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑃𝑃 = 7 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁 �𝑄𝑄
𝐾𝐾
�
2 ,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.  
(𝑄𝑄
𝐾𝐾
)2 = (22.45.5 )2 = 16.6 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
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K-factor for BL is calculated as KBL = QBL/(PBL)1/2. The hydraulic calculation form (Table 
7) along with the piping layouts (Figure 14 and 15) are provided to follow the pressure loss and 
flow requirements calculation in the pipes. 
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Table 7. Node analysis data 
 
 
Ste
p 
No.
Elev 
(ft)
K-
Fact
or
Pipe 
size
Pipe 
Fitti
ngs 
and 
1 456 5.5 q 22.4 L 12 C= 120 Pt 16.6
1 BL-1 1.38 F Pe 0.0
2 456 Q 22.4 T 12 pf 0.042 Pf 0.5
2 456 5.5 q 22.8 L 12 C= 120.00 Pt 17.1
2 BL-1 1.38 F Pe 0.0
3 456 Q 45.2 T 12 pf 0.154 Pf 1.9
3 456 5.5 q 24.0 L 12 C= 120 Pt 19.0
3 BL-1 1.38 F Pe 0.0
4 456 Q 69.1 T 12 pf 0.339 Pf 4.1
4 456 5.5 q 26.4 L 2 C= 120 Pt 23.1
4 BL-1 1.38 E F 4 Pe 0.9
31 454 Q 95.5 T 6 pf 0.618 Pf 3.7
31 454 0 q 0.0 L 7 C= 120 Pt 27.6
5 CM 3.068 T F 15 Pe 0.0
32 454 Q 95.5 T 22 pf 0.013 Pf 0.3
5 456 18.2 q 96.0 L 36 C= 120 Pt 27.9
6 BL-2 1.38 E F 4 Pe 0.9
32 454 Q 96.0 T 40 pf 0.623 Pf 24.9
32 454 0 q 0.0 L 8 C= 120 Pt 27.9
7 CM 3.068 T F 15 Pe
33 454 Q 191.5 T 23 pf 0.046 Pf 1.1
9 456 18.2 q 97.8 L 36 C= 120 Pt 29.0
8 BL-3 1.38 E F 4 Pe
33 454 Q 97.8 T 40 pf 0.645 Pf 25.8
33 454 0 q 0.0 L 10.5 C= 120.0 Pt 29.0
9 CM 3.068 T F 15 Pe 0.0
34 454 Q 289.3 T 25.5 pf 0.098 Pf 2.5
13 456 18.2 q 101.9 L 36 C= 120 Pt 31.5
10 BL-4 1.38 E F 4 Pe 0.9
34 454 Q 101.9 T 40 pf 0.696 Pf 27.9
34 454 0 q 0.0 L 10.5 C= 120 Pt 31.5
11 CM 3.068 T F 15 Pe 0.0
35 454 Q 391.3 T 25.5 pf 0.171 Pf 4.4
17 456 5.5 q 32.9 L 36 C= 120 Pt 35.8
12 BL-5 1.38 E F 4 Pe 0.0
35 456 Q 32.9 T 40 pf 0.086 Pf 3.4
35 454 0 q 0.0 T L 35 C= 120 Pt 39.3
13 CM 3.068 L F 20 Pe 0.0
41 454 Q 424.2 T 55 pf 0.199 Pf 10.9
41 454 0 q 0.0 E4 L 120 C= 120 Pt 50.2
14 R 4.026 T6 F 150.8 Pe 21.2
90 405 Q 424.2 L2C1 T 270.8 pf 0.053 Pf 14.3
90 405 0 q 0.0 E4 L 380 C= 120 Pt 85.8
15 FM 4.026 T6 F 188 Pe 13.0
100 375 Q 424.2 LC T 568 pf 0.053 Pf 30.1
Pt 128.8
Q 424.2
Nozzle 
Ident and 
Location
Flow in 
gpm
Equivalent 
Pipe 
Length
Friction 
loss (psi/ft)
Pressure 
Summary
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Hose Stream Allowance. Per NFPA 13 minimum water demand requirements for a 
sprinkler system shall be determined by adding the hose stream allowance (HSA) to the water 
demand for sprinklers (NFPA 13 section 11.1.4.2). Per Table 11.2.3.1.2 of NFPA 13, total hose 
stream allowance of 250 gpm is required to be supplied for the duration of minimum 60 minutes. 
Table 8 shows the result of the hydraulic analysis.  
Table 8. Sprinkler design data for Grid-iron level. 
Occupancy classification: Ordinary hazard, group 2 
Density: 0.2 gpm/sq. ft. [NFPA 13 section 11.2.3.2.1.2] 
Area of application: 1500 sq. ft. [NFPA 13 section 11.2.3.2.1.2] 
Number of sprinklers calculated: 17 sprinklers 
Total sprinkler water flow required: 424.2 gpm 
Total Hose Stream Allowance at Source: 250.0 gpm 
Total water required (including hose): 674.2 gpm 
Required pressure 128.8 psi 
Available pressure at total demand  100 psi 
Sprinkler orifice size: ½ inch.  
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Figure 16. Hydraulic graph showing supply and demand curve. The values on the y-axis are doubled. 
Figure 16 shows the total water demand for the sprinkler system. The city water supply is 
not adequate for the sprinkler system and hose stream demands. The total demand for the system 
is 674.2 gpm at 128.8 psi. From the graph, we can see, at 674.2 gpm flow rate the available 
pressure is 100 psi, hence not meeting the demand. 
Supervision 
Water flow detection devices are provided at lateral connections to the riser (Figure 17). 
Valve supervision devices are provided on all sprinkler water valves. Central station monitoring 
is provided for all valve supervision and water flow detection devices.  
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Figure 17. A flow detector and supervision device connected to a riser and control valve. 
Standpipes.  
Standpipe risers are combined with automatic sprinkler risers. Class II standpipe are 
located on each side of the stage. Figure 18 shows one of the standpipe connection located at the 
stage. 
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Figure 18. Class II Standpipe system with a fire extinguisher.  
Inspection, Testing and Maintenance Requirements 
Maintenance procedures are critical, such as those required by NFPA 25; Standard for the 
Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems includes 
evaluation of the factors that affect system performance. 
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Frequency and Timing of Testing and Inspection. NFPA 25 requires testing of 
representative samples of installed sprinklers periodically to verify continued performance. 
Testing and inspection should comprise 1% of the total number of sprinklers installed in the 
facility and never be less than four sprinklers. Replacement is necessary of any sprinkler that 
shows signs of: contamination (loading), corrosion and paint (other than the paint applied by the 
manufacturer).  
Dust. Light dust may be found on sprinklers which are less serious than hard deposits. 
Dust may delay the operation of sprinklers but not prevent the eventual discharge of water. Dust 
can be blown or brush off. Compressed air may create dust explosion or ignition hazard. Brushes 
should be soft to avoid possible injury to sprinkler parts. 
Advance Preparations before Shutoff. It is dangerous when water supply is shut off 
(protection is interrupted). Effort must be made to limit the extent and duration of the 
interruption. Notify the fire department whenever impairment exists. Plan to work for a time 
when the least hazard exists. Work should be done on a weekend or another idle period. Utilize 
special guard service if required, to help in detection of any fire that might develop while the 
systems are shut off. Sectional valves, rather than main values, should be used to reduce to a 
minimum the number of shutoff systems and to take advantage of multiple water supplies. For 
underground mains tapping machines should be used when possible to avoid shutting off the 
water. During shutoff maintain the maximum possible water supply. When repair or 
modifications are necessary, a fire protection system may need to be taken out of service. It is 
Ideal to appoint an impairment coordinator familiar with the operation of the system. During any 
equipment shutdown, a lockout and/or tag out procedure should be in place. A tag should be 
posted on any valve that is closed.  
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Control Valves and Meters. Tightness of check valves should be determined 
periodically by proper tests arranged and located in accordance with the appropriate NFPA 
standards. Valves should be readily accessible and unobstructed. Valves must be able to be 
operated promptly and examined. Pits for gate valves and check valves should be dry and clean. 
Manhole covers should be kept clear. Each control valve should be numbered, identified, 
cataloged by location, portion of the system, etc. Locations should be posted at a central point 
known to public fire officials. Check valves should have a sign showing what it controls; with 
the legend “Must Be Open at All Times”. Underground valve sites should be shown by location 
and by distance markings on nearby buildings and on accurate plans of the property. Wrenches 
should be kept at post indicator valves or at locations where they are readily accessible. 
Sprinklers and Sprinkler Piping. Clearance of sprinklers should be reviewed. 
Obstructions by high-piled stock, walls, or partitions that might prevent free and proper water 
distribution. Clear space of 18 in. below the deflectors of the sprinklers is required. 
Position of Deflectors. Distance of deflectors from the ceiling or the bottom of beams or 
joists should conform to NFPA 13. Items should never be stacked close to fire sprinklers. Tops of 
storage or furniture should be at least 18” below fire sprinklers. 
Support of Piping. Loose hangers and loose, unsupported pipes should be looked for. 
Sprinkler piping and hangers should never be used for purposes unrelated to its function. 
System Water Flow Tests. NFPA 13 requires a water supply test of pipe and pressure 
gauges to be provided at locations that will permit flowing tests to be made to determine whether 
water supplies and connections are in order. A 2-in. diameter drain at the sprinkler riser may 
suffice as a water supply test pipe. The valve of the water supply test pipe must be installed so 
that the valve may be opened wide for a sufficient time to ensure a proper test, without causing 
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water damage. At each inspection, an individual flow test should be made for each water supply 
and each connection from a supply. System water flow test shall be accomplished by closing all 
water supplies temporarily, except the one under test. To make sure that there is free flow at good 
pressure and to test the water flow alarm system water flow tests shall be operated atleast twice a 
year. Two tests, the Main Drain Test and the Inspector’s Test, should be conducted to ensure 
sprinkler systems and sprinkler water flow alarms are operational and water supplies are not 
impaired. 
Inspector’s Test. The area around the inspector’s test discharge should be checked to 
determine that the water released during the test will drain away safely and not cause damage. 
The inspector’s test valve should be opened fully and allow the water to run for a minimum of 90 
seconds or until the audible alarm on the premises operates. The time the valve was opened 
should be recorded for confirmation with the alarm monitoring company receipt of the alarm. An 
audible alarm on the premises should operate within five minutes of opening the inspector’s test 
connection and water flow begins. The inspector’s test valve should be closed. The time the 
valve was closed should be recorded for confirmation with the alarm monitoring company 
receipt of the alarm. Water flow alarms should be restored on the local fire alarm control unit 
(panel). 
Main Drain Test. Check the area around the main drain discharge pipe should be checked 
to ensure that water will drain away safely and not cause damage. The main control valve should 
be unlocked so that it can be shut quickly if a problem develops during the test. The valve should 
be closed two or three turns, and then the valve should be returned to the fully open position. 
This should send a tamper signal to the alarm company. The static pressure should be recorded 
on the supply side pressure gauge prior to the test. The main drain valve should be opened slowly 
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until it is fully open. The water should be allowed to flow until the pressure stabilizes, then the 
residual pressure should be recorded using the same gauge. The main drain valve should be 
closed slowly to avoid water hammer. When it is closed, the static pressure should be recorded 
on the supply side pressure gauge. 
Fire Department Connections. It should be ensured that the caps are in place, threads 
are in good condition, ball drip or drain is in order and check valve is not leaking. Hydrostatic 
test should be conducted periodically on older FDC piping to ensure that it will withstand the 
required pressure. 
Automatic sprinkler protection is provided in Christopher Cohan Center as required by 
IBC. No records or assertions of regular testing or maintenance of the automatic sprinkler system 
were collected. A Class II standpipe system is provided in the building. As an assembly 
occupancy building with a legitimate stage, Christopher Cohan Center requires a Class II 
standpipe system. No records or assertions of regular testing or maintenance of the standpipe 
system were collected. These systems are supplied from city water main having a reported static 
pressure of 130 psi and residual pressure of 60 psi when 1100 gpm flowing, which does not meet 
the hydraulic demand, calculated for the most challenging design area. There was no fire pump 
connected to the system. A fire pump appears to be needed for the standpipe system and 
automatic sprinkler system demand. 
Fire detection and alarm systems  
A fire alarm system is provided in accordance with provisions of IBC. The fire alarm 
system consists of initiation devices, both manual and automatic; a fire alarm control panel to 
process incoming alarm, supervision and trouble signals and activate desired output devices; an 
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occupant notification system, consisting of both audible and visual devices, and a connection to a 
central station monitoring service.  
The alarm system receives alarm signals from manual pull stations, automatic sprinkler 
water flow indicators, automatic smoke detectors and automatic heat detectors. A manual alarm 
system is provided. Manual pull stations (Figure 19) are provided adjacent to exit stair doors, 
adjacent to required stage exits and wherever additional stations are required along the exit path 
to not exceed a 200-foot travel distance to the nearest station. 
 
Figure 19. Standard UL-listed manual pull stations used at Christopher Cohan Center. 
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Occupant notification system  
The occupant notification system is an approved public address system. The activation of 
any alarm signal automatically activates the voice alarm system. An approved pre-recorded 
message announcement is played. Manual controls for activating the voice alarm system or 
making general announcements are provided adjacent to the fire alarm control panel. Table 9 
provides the model number for different types of anunciation devices that are installed at the 
Christopher Cohan Center. Figure 20 shows an exemplar speaker-strobe installed in the premise.  
Table 9. Model numbers of the notification devices used in Christopher Cohan Center 
 Model# CSFM # 
Speaker strobe (wall 
mounted) (Figure 20) 
ET-1070-LSM-24-VFR 7125-0785125 
Speaker strobe ET-1070-LSM-24-VFR 7125-0785.125 
Speaker only 4902-9702 7320-0026199 
Visual only 4904-9135 7125-0026198 
Remote Lamp 2098-9808 7300-0026150 
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Figure 20. Standard UL-listed speaker-strobe used at Christopher Cohan Center. 
Fire Alarm Control Panel 
The location of the Fire Alarm Control Panel is at the Security Room on the Lower Level. 
The model number is 4120-8210. Figure 21 shows the fire alarm control panel. A fire alarm 
miniplex panel is provided with a model number 4120-8210. The location of the main Fire Alarm 
Control Panel and the miniplex panel is shown in Figure 22.  
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Figure 21 Fire Alarm Control Panel 
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Figure 22 Location of Fire Alarm Control Panel and the miniplex panel. 
Fire Signatures and Detection Devices 
The types of initiating devices that are installed in the Christopher Cohan Center are as 
followed.  
1. Smoke and Ionization Detectors 
2. Rate of Rise Heat Detectors 
3. Break Glass, Fire Reporting Stations 
4. Break Glass Stations with Bell and Strobe above 
5. Connections to Flow Switches 
6. Connections to Tamper Switches 
7. Connections to Flow and Tamper Switches  
8. Smoke and Ionization Detectors with Sampling Tubes 
Table 10 provides model numbers of the initiating devices that are installed.  
Table 10. Model and CSFM numbers of initiating devices. 
 Model # CSFM# 
Main Fire Alarm Control Panel 
Fire Alarm Miniplex Panel 
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Smoke Detector 2098-9201 (Head), 2098-
9651 (Base) 
7272-0026132 (Head), 7300-
0026149 (Base) 
Smoke Detector 4098-9783 (Base), 4098-9701 
(Head), 2098-9737 (Relay) 
7300-0026165 (Base), 7272-
0026166 (Head), 7300-
0026013 (Relay) 
Heat Detector 4098-9731 (Head), 4098-
9781 (Base) 
7270-0026176 (Head), 7300-
0026165 (Base) 
Manual Pull Station 2099-9795 7150-0026175 
Door Holder 2088-9585 3550-0026176 
Duct Detector 2098-9702 (Housing), 20988-
9201 (Head) 
3240-0026159 (Housing), 
7272-0026132 (Head) 
Tamper Switch   
Water Flow Switch   
Remote Lamp 2098-9808 7300-0026182 
 
Location, spacing and placement of fire detection devices 
The locations of initiating devices installed in different levels are shown in Figure 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27 and 28. 
 
Figure 23. Location of initiating devices on the Basement. 
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Figure 24. Location of initiating devices on the Orchestra stage level. 
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Figure 25. Location of the initiating devices on the Entry Lobby level. 
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Figure 26. Location of initiating devices on the Balcony level. 
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Figure 27. Location of initiating devices on the Gallery level. 
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Figure 28. Location of initiating devices on the Catwalk level. 
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Fire alarm system response requirements 
Alarm, supervisory and trouble signals are received at the central station monitoring 
service. The fire alarm receives alarm signals from manual pull stations, automatic sprinkler 
water flow indicators, automatic smoke detectors and automatic heat detectors as shown in the 
sequence of matrix (Table 11).  
The fire alarm receives supervisory and trouble signals from sprinkler water supply valve 
tamper switch, emergency power status and public notification system.  
The central station monitoring service is required to perform the following actions upon 
receipt of an alarm signal:  
1. Immediately retransmit alarm to communications center.  
2. Dispatch a runner or technician to arrive within 2 hours if equipment needs to be 
manually reset by prime contractor.   
3. Immediately notify the management of the Performing Arts Center.  
4. Provide notice to AHJ if required. 
The central station monitoring service is required to perform the following actions upon 
receipt of a supervisory signal:  
1. Communicate immediately with the persons designated by the administration of 
Performing Arts Center and notify the Fire Department when required by the AHJ.   
2. Dispatch a runner or maintenance person within 2 hours to investigate. 
3. Notify the AHJ when sprinkler systems or other suppression equipment has been 
out of service for 8 hrs. And provide notice when service has been restored. 
The central station monitoring service is required to perform the following actions upon 
receipt of a trouble signal:  
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1. Communicate immediately with the persons designated by the administration of 
Performing Arts Center and dispatch personnel to arrive within 4 hours to initiate maintenance if 
necessary. 
2. Notify the AHJ if required when interruption is more than 8 hrs.   
Sequence of operation matrix 
Table 11. Sequence of operation matrix. 
Device Activate 
Speaker / 
Strobe 
Signal CSMS Trouble 
indication 
Supervisory 
signal 
System to run 
on battery 
back-up 
Manual pull 
station 
X X    
Smoke 
detector 
X X    
Heat detector  X X    
Duct detector X X    
Water flow X X    
Tamper 
switch 
 X X X  
System 
trouble 
 X X X  
Power failure  X X X X 
 
Battery requirements 
Battery requirements are calculated for the miniplex and fire alarm control panel (Table 
12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17). 
Miniplex.  
The miniplex panel modules require total 0.82 AH current to stand-by. The field devices 
require additional 0.185 AH current. For 24-hour standby, the panel needs a total of 24.144 AH 
capacity. The panel modules and the field devices require a total of 18.7 AH during alarm mode. 
For five minutes of alarm, the panel needs 1.55 AH. Adding the required current for 24-hr stand-
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by and 5-minutes of alarm, the battery requires a minimum of 25.7 AH battery capacity. A 50 AH 
battery is provided.       
Table 12. Panel modules of the minplex panel. 
Q Product ID Description Standby  Alarm  
   Each Total Each Total 
1 4120-0110 Mapnet II Module 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49 
1 4120-0203 Audio AMP 25W 0.25 0.25 8.75 8.75 
3 4120-4331 6 Signal circuit, style Y 0.025 0.075 0.07 0.21 
1 4120-3003 8-point aux relay 0.025 0.025 0.28 0.28 
  Panel standby current  0.82   
  Panel alarm current    9.73 
 
Table 13. Field devices connected to minplex panel. 
Q Product ID Description Standby  Alarm  
   Each Total Each Total 
4 2098-9645 Addressable duct detector 0.024 0.096 0.024 0.096 
9 2190-9163 Control zam 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.36 
2 2098-9808 Remote alarm indicator 0 0 0.115 8.51 
74 ET-1070-
LSM-24-
VFR 
Wheelock Audio/visual 0 0 0.115 8.51 
  Device standby current  0.186   
  Device alarm current    8.968 
 
Table 14. Total system current for miniplex panel 
Description Standby Alarm 
Control panel 0.82 9.73 
Field devices 0.186 8.968 
Total standby current 1.006  
24-hour standby 24.144  
Total alarm current  18.698 
5 minutes of alarm  1.551934 
Total battery requirement  25.695934 
Battery supplied  50 AH 
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Fire alarm control panel 
The panel modules require a total of 1.585 AH during stand-by and 21.04 AH during 
alarm. The field devices require 0.334 AH during stand-by and 11.796 AH during alarm. Total 
standby current is calculated to be 1.919 amp for 1 hour. So, 46.056 AH capacity is needed for 
24-hour stand-by operation. Total alarm current is calculated to be 32.836 amp for 1 hour. So, for 
five minutes of alarm 2.72 AH current is needed. For 5-minute alarm and 24-hr stand-by 
operation, a total of 48.78 AH current capacity is required. A battery with 50 AH capacity is 
provided.  
Table 15. Panel modules for the main panel. 
Q Product ID Description Standby  Alarm  
   Each Total Each Total 
1 4120-0110 Mapnet II Module 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49 
1 4120-0201 Audio AMP 25W 0.15 0.15 2 2 
2 4120-0203 100W Amplifier W/P.S 120 
V 
0.25 0.5 8.75 17.5 
1 4120-0210 Single channel audio 
controller 
0.185 0.185 0.185 0.185 
1 4120-0301 LED/SW Controller 0.015 0.015 0.26 0.26 
1 4120-3002 4 relays 0.015 0.015 0.175 0.175 
4 4120-4321 6 signal circuit, style Y 0.025 0.1 0.07 0.28 
1 4120-6011 RS-485 Network interface 
card 
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
  Panel standby current  1.585   
  Panel alarm current    21.04 
 
Table 16. Field devices connected to the main panel. 
Q Product ID Description Standby  Alarm  
   Each Total Each Total 
9 4904-9135 Wall-mount strobe 0 0 0.1 0.9 
11 2098-9645 Addressable duct detector 0.024 0.264 0.024 0.264 
7 2190-9163 Control zam 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.28 
2 2098-9808 Remote alarm indicator 0 0 0.001 0.002 
90 ET-1070-
LSM-24-
VFR 
Wheelock Audio/visual 0 0 0.115 10.35 
  Device standby current  0.334   
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  Device alarm current    11.796 
 
Table 17. Total system current requirement for main panel. 
Description Standby Alarm 
Control panel 1.585 21.04 
Field devices 0.334 11.796 
Total standby current 1.919  
24-hour standby 46.056  
Total alarm current  32.836 
5 minute of alarm  2.725388 
Total battery requirement  48.781388 
Battery supplied  50 AH 
 
Voltage drop 
Highest percentage of voltage drop is identified at the signal circuit connecting the 
strobes at the orchestra stage level. The calculation is shown below.  
Device 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
Gauge 
wire 
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Distance 
(ft) 
218 68 18 111 30 8 48 7 27 13 
AMPs at 
device 
1.12 1.005 0.89 0.775 0.66 0.56 0.46 0.345 0.23 0.115 
AMPs 
developed 
volt drop  
0.776 0.217 0.50 0.273 0.062 0.014 0.070 0.007 0.0197 0.0047 
 
Total CKT VD 1.49786 
CKT Voltage 24 
% voltage drop 6.24108 
 
Christopher Cohan Center relies primarily on sprinklers and manual fire alarm system for 
detection and annunciation. Although IBC allows omission of manual fire alarm boxes in the 
presence of sprinkler system, the Christopher Cohan Center is equipped with both. The exception 
does not eliminate the provision for occupant notification system, and accordingly, a public-
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address system is provided in the building. The public-address system should allow the 
automatic alarm signals to be overridden for live voice instructions. However, the conjunction of 
all these systems requires effective sequence of operation matrix in place, which is found to be 
present.  
The building has an addressable fire alarm system built around a Honeywell Notifier 
alarm panel. The system supported smoke detectors, heat detectors, manual pull stations and 
speaker-strobe units installed throughout the complex. No functional test was conducted on the 
system during the inspection. No records or assertions of regular testing or maintenance of the 
fire alarm system were collected. 
Interconnected smoke and heat detectors are in various places throughout the building. 
These detectors are tied into the fire alarm system. In the event, they detect smoke and heat, they 
would send a signal to the fire alarm control panel to activate the fire alarm. No records or 
assertions of regular testing or maintenance of the fire detection system were collected. 
Stage Smoke Removal  
Gravity vents are located near the center and at the highest point above the stage. The 
gravity vents are activated by a fusible link. Manual controls are also provided. The total gravity 
vent area is approximately 224 square feet which exceeds the minimum 5% of stage floor area 
required by IBC section 410.3.7.1. Figure 29 shows an exemplar gravity vent, which is like the 
ones installed in Christopher Cohan Center.   
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Figure 29. A part of the product data sheet of the smoke vent used at Christopher Cohan Center. 
Recommended Fire Safety Management Practices 
Public Assemblages and Events 
Fire watch personnel. Because of the number of persons, and the nature of the 
performance, exhibition, display, contest and activity, the management, agent and lessee should 
provide one or more fire watch personnel. It is essential for public safety in Christopher Cohan 
Center. Fire watch personnel should remain on duty during the times the place is open to the 
public, and when such activity is being conducted. 
Duties. Fire watch personnel should keep diligent watch for fires. They should see if any 
obstructions or other hazards are present at the means of egress, during the time the building is 
open to the public and an activity is being conducted. They should take prompt measures for 
remediation of hazards, extinguishment of fires that occur and assist in the evacuation of the 
public from the structure.  
Crowd managers. Trained crowd managers shall be provided for facilities or events 
where more than 1,000 persons congregate. The minimum number of crowd managers shall be 
established at a ratio of one crowd manager to every 250 persons. 
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Emergency Evacuation Drills 
Frequency. Required emergency evacuation drills shall be held quarterly or more 
frequently if necessary to familiarize all employees including the volunteers with the drill 
procedure.  
Leadership. Responsibility for the planning and conduct of drills shall be assigned to 
competent persons designated to exercise leadership.  
Time. Drills shall be held at unexpected times and under varying conditions to simulate 
the unusual conditions that occur in case of fire.  
Record keeping. Records shall be maintained of required emergency evacuation drills 
and include the following information: 
a. Identity of the person conducting the drill.  
b. Date and time of the drill.  
c. Notification method used.  
d. Staff members on duty and participating.  
e. Number of occupants evacuated.  
f. Special conditions simulated.  
g. Problems encountered.  
h. Weather conditions when occupants were evacuated.  
i. Time required to accomplish complete evacuation.  
Initiation. Emergency evacuation drills shall be initiated by activating the fire alarm 
system.  
Accountability. As building occupants arrive at the assembly point, efforts shall be made 
to determine if all occupants have been successfully evacuated or have been accounted for.  
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Recall and reentry. An electrically or mechanically operated signal used to recall 
occupants after an evacuation shall be separate and distinct from the signal used to initiate the 
evacuation. The recall signal initiation means shall be manually operated and under the control of 
the person in charge of the premise or the official in charge of the incident. No one shall enter the 
premise until authorized to do so by the official in charge.  
Employee Training and Response Procedures 
General. Employees shall be trained in the fire emergency procedures described in their 
fire evacuation and fire safety plans. 
Frequency. Employees shall receive training in the contents of fire safety and evacuation 
plans and their duties as part of new employee orientation and at least annually thereafter. 
Records shall be kept and made available to the fire code official upon request.  
Employee training program. Employees shall be trained in fire prevention, evacuation 
and fire safety in accordance with the following: 
Fire prevention training. Employees shall be apprised of the fire hazards of the materials 
and processes to which they are exposed. Each employee shall be instructed in the proper 
procedures for preventing fires in the conduct of their assigned duties.  
Evacuation training. Employees shall be familiarized with the fire alarm and evacuation 
signals, their assigned duties in the event of an alarm or emergency, evacuation routes, areas of 
refuge, exterior assembly areas and procedures in the event of an emergency lockdown.  
Emergency lockdown training. Employees shall be trained on their assigned duties and 
procedures in the event of an emergency lockdown.  
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Fire safety training. Employees assigned fire-fighting duties shall be trained to know the 
locations and proper use of portable fire extinguishers or other manual fire-fighting equipment 
and the protective clothing or equipment required for its safe and proper use.  
Use and Occupancy-related Requirements 
Announcements. In Christopher Cohan Center, an audible announcement shall be made 
not more than 10 minutes prior to start of each program to notify the occupants of the location of 
the exits to be used in the event of a fire or other emergencies. 
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Performance-based analysis 
The SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance Based Fire Protection deﬁnes performance 
based design as “an engineering approach to ﬁre protection design based on (1) agreed upon ﬁre 
safety goals and objectives, (2) deterministic and/or probabilistic analysis of ﬁre scenarios, and 
(3) quantitative assessment of design alternatives against the ﬁre safety goals and objectives 
using accepted engineering tools, methodologies, and performance criteria.”  
This deﬁnition identiﬁes three key attributes of performance-based design. The ﬁrst is a 
description of the desired level of ﬁre safety in a building (or other structure) in the event of a 
ﬁre. The second attribute includes deﬁnition of the “design basis” of the building. The “design 
basis” is an identiﬁcation of the types of ﬁres, occupant characteristics, and building 
characteristics for which the ﬁre safety systems in the building are intended to provide 
protection. In the vernacular of performance-based design, these ﬁres are referred to as “design 
ﬁre scenarios.” The third element involves an engineering analysis of proposed design strategies 
to determine whether they provide the intended level of safety in the event of the design ﬁre 
scenarios.  
In the process of evaluating Christopher Cohan Center, these three attributes of 
performance-based design are used. The desired level of safety in the building in the event of a 
fire would thought to be achieved if the performance objectives set by the International Building 
Code are fulfilled. The performance objectives that are specified in the International Building 
Code commentary, which are applicable to the context of Christopher Cohan Center are –  
1. limit the threat from stage fires to an audience  
2. reduce the likelihood of a large fire in the stage area 
3. reduce the opportunity for irrational mass response to a perceived emergency. 
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Deterministic analysis of fire scenarios in Christopher Cohan Center  
In a deterministic analysis, scenarios that are expected to occur with a frequency above a 
threshold value are analyzed to determine their consequences. If the consequences of those 
scenarios are within the design objectives, then the design is acceptable.  
Design Fire Scenarios 
Per NFPA 101 section 5.5.3 design fire scenarios should comply with the following: 
(1) Scenarios selected as design fire scenarios shall include, but shall not be limited 
to, those specified in 5.5.3.1 through 5.5.3.8.  
(2) Design fire scenarios demonstrated to the satisfaction of the authority having 
jurisdiction as inappropriate for the building use and conditions shall not be required to be 
evaluated fully.  
NFPA 101 5.5.3.1 Design Fire Scenario 1. It is an occupancy-specific fire representative 
of a typical fire for the occupancy. It explicitly accounts for the occupant activities, number and 
location of occupants, room size, contents and furnishings, fuel properties and ignition sources, 
ventilation conditions, identification of the first item ignited and its location.  
NFPA 101 5.5.3.2 Design Fire Scenario 2. Design Fire Scenario is an ultrafast-
developing fire, in the primary means of egress, with interior doors open at the start of the fire. It 
addresses the concern regarding a reduction in the number of available means of egress.  
NFPA 101 5.5.3.3 Design Fire Scenario 3. Design Fire Scenario 3 is a fire that starts in a 
normally unoccupied room, potentially endangering many occupants in a large room or other 
area. It addresses the concern regarding a fire originating in a concealed space that does not have 
either a detection system or a suppression system and then spreading into the room within the 
building that potentially holds the greatest number of occupants.  
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NFPA 101 5.5.3.4 Design Fire Scenario 4. Design Fire Scenario 4 is a fire that 
originated in a conceal wall or ceiling space adjacent to a large occupied room. It addresses the 
concern regarding a fire originating in a concealed space that does not have either a detection 
system or a suppression system and then spreading into the room within the building that 
potentially holds the greatest number of occupants.  
NFPA 101 5.5.3.5 Design Fire Scenario 5. Design Fire Scenario 5 is a slowly 
developing fire, shielded from fire protection systems, near a high occupancy area. It addresses 
the concern regarding a relatively small ignition source causing a significant fire.  
NFPA 101 5.5.3.6 Design Fire Scenario 6. Design Fire Scenario 6 is the most severe fire 
resulting from the largest possible fuel load characteristic of the normal operation of the building. 
It addresses the concern regarding a rapidly developing fire when occupants are present. 
NFPA 101 5.5.3.7. Design Fire Scenario 7. Design Fire Scenario 7 is an outside 
exposure fire. It addresses the concerns regarding a fire starting at a location remote from the 
area of concern and either spreading into the area, blocking escape from the area, or developing 
untenable conditions within the area.   
NFPA 101 5.5.3.8. Design Fire Scenario 8. Design Fire Scenario 8 is a fire originating 
in ordinary combustibles in a room or area with each passive or active fire protection system 
independently rendered ineffective. It addresses concerns regarding the unreliability or 
unviability of each fire protection system or fire protection feature, considered individually. It is 
not required to be applied to fire protection systems for which both the level of reliability and the 
design performance in the absence of the system are acceptable to the authority having 
jurisdiction. 
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Historically, most significant theater fires originated on the stage. The 1903 Iroquois 
Theater fire in Chicago serves as a vivid example of a stage fire and its potentially tragic 
effects—602 people lost their lives. Hazards associated with the stage include: combustible 
scenery and lighting suspended overhead; scenic elements, contents and acoustical treatment on 
the back and sides of the stage; technical production areas including dressing rooms located 
around the stage perimeter; and storage areas located underneath the stage. Design fire scenario 1 
and 6 are applicable in evaluating the fire hazards in Christopher Cohan Center originating on 
the stage, as these two scenarios talks about occupancy-specific fire representative of a typical 
fire with the concern regarding a rapidly developing fire when occupants are present.  
IBC section 410.3.6 recognizes that scenery and sets used in the stage are decorative 
materials. As such, combustible materials used in sets and scenery are required to meet the fire 
propagation performance criteria in accordance with the provisions of NFPA 701 Standard 
Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of Textiles and Films, Section 806 and the IFC. 
Section 806 references Section 2604 for specific requirements for foam plastics used as trim. The 
materials when tested in accordance with NFPA 701 must comply with the performance criteria 
of one of the two identified test methods.  
Curtains, draperies, and wall coverings can ignite from such ignition sources as electrical 
malfunction. It has been shown that large differences exist between the potential of various 
curtain materials to the production of heat and smoke. Curtains in public occupancies are 
regulated by local authorities and conforming materials do not seem to present major problems 
during the initial stages of a fire. NFPA 701 recently addressed that, even if single layers of 
curtain fabrics pass the requirements of the standard, the combination of two or three layers, may 
burn vigorously.  
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Flammability characteristics of materials used in sets and scenery 
Materials that are used to create sets and sceneries are divided into two major classes: (1) 
flexible materials, such as textiles and cushioning; and (2) structural materials, which can include 
wood or engineered wood composites and synthetic thermoplastics and plastic foams (Figure 
30). For both classes of materials there is a variety of tests to determine their susceptibility to 
ignition. However, since ignition requires the volatilization of some of the solid fuel, ignition 
behavior is strongly dependent on the amount of heat applied to the surface. Therefore, different 
ignition tests often give different results, depending on the size of the ignition source. The same 
principle applies to tests that attempt to measure flame spread over small samples. The larger the 
amount of sample burning, the greater the heat transferred to the unburned area ahead of the 
flame and a large sample will appear to have a higher flame spread rate than a small one. 
The ignitability, flame spread and heat release rates, total heat produced, heat shrinkage, 
and ease of fire extinction in textile materials depend on the type of fibers used, their percent 
content, the configuration of the fabric, its weight, and its construction. The finish generally does 
not alter these properties significantly, unless the fabric is treated with a flame retardant. Flame-
retardant treatments can be either durable or nondurable. Normal laundering and dry cleaning 
may reduce flame retardancy. 
All common natural fibers contain organic compounds and the elements carbon and 
hydrogen and often also oxygen and nitrogen. Coating added to textile fabrics can greatly alter 
their combustibility. Several coatings are commonly applied to fabrics or bonded to fabrics to 
create laminates. Coated or laminated fabrics exhibit combustibility characteristics of the coating 
or film and the fiber used. Chlorine is found in vinyl-coated fabrics. 
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Thermoplastics are hard to ignite. There are, however, many situations in which 
thermoplastics can burn readily, especially when they are stiffened by finishes or heavy dye 
application, causing them to lose their ability to evade flames and ablate. It also occurs in blends 
of thermoplastic and char-forming fibers, for example, in the popular polyester/cotton blends, 
which burn more like 100 percent cotton than 100 percent polyester. A thermoplastic fiber fabric 
in contact with a char-forming fabric, for example, a polyester curtain in contact with a foam 
lining, can burn readily. Finally, if an ablated thermoplastic fabric still flames when it falls, it can 
ignite garments or furnishings near it. 
The ranges of decomposition, melting, ignition, and the burning temperatures of the 
flames are often quite wide for any one fiber because of the differences in methods for measuring 
such temperatures, as well as the variety of polymer compositions used in each fiber group for 
various end uses. In the case of nylon, there are two major types, Nylon 6 and Nylon 66, which 
vary in the structure of the base molecule. For the ignition temperature of cotton, one finds two 
values in the literature, that is, 490 and 750°F (255 and 400°C); it is possible that the lower value 
was obtained with aged cotton. The ignition temperature of blends tends to be like that of the 
component with the lower ignition temperature. Thus, measured by one method, the ignition 
temperature for 14 different fiber types ranged from 750°F (400°C) for cotton to 1110°F (600°C) 
for wool; 50/50 blends of cotton and another fiber ranged from 770 to 860°F (410 to 460°C). 
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Figure 30. A set made of flexible and structural materials on the stage of Christopher Cohan Center. 
Effect of orientation 
Vertical configuration is quite common in the stage, as seen on Figure 31. Fabrics 
generally burn faster in the vertical position than in the horizontal position. The edge of the 
fabric will also ignite much more easily than the surface, given the ability of the flame to contact 
more than one side. Some fabrics melt when burned, form a pool, and require other combustibles 
to act as a wick before their full combustibility can be exhibited. 
Fire established on vertical combustible surfaces are especially dangerous because of the 
potential for rapid upward fire spread. Such surfaces are common in the stage environment. 
Flames on vertical burning surfaces transition from a steady laminar flow to a turbulent flow 
near the flame base. With increasing height on the vertical surface, flame thickness increases 
proportionally, which results in increased thermal radiation both to the material surface and 
outward to potential targets. 
Upward flame spread is driven by heat transfer in the region between the top of the active 
burning zone and the flame tip. Because of the heat transfer in this region, ignition occurs after a 
time controlled by thermal inertia. For a combustible surface that can support upward flame 
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spread, the rate of increase of flame height is proportional to the current flame height, which 
translates into an exponential increase in flame height with time or a constant time to doubling of 
flame height. Therefore, vertical surface burning is so hazardous. 
On a vertical surface, the heat flow to the lowest 6 to 10 in. of the surface from the flames 
is dominated by convective heat transfer, but the remainder of the burning surface above this 
level is primarily subject to thermal radiation heat transfer. The burning vertical surface receives 
a roughly constant 10 kW/m2 of convective heating, a low level partly due to the cooling effect 
of the flow of fuel vapors from the surface. In contrast to convection, levels of radiant heat flux 
incident on the burning material surface increase steadily with height until flames become 
optically thick. The layer of cool soot-laden vapor near the material surface is less effective in 
blocking the incident radiation for a wall fire. And so, heat fluxes over 100 kW/m2 are possible.  
 
Figure 31. Verticality is used to visually connect with the full audience of the hall. 
Smoke hazard  
Smoke is usually the primary threat to life safety. Three major effects of smoke can be 
identified: light obscuration, toxicity, and post fire impact. The first two effects are closely 
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related: smoke can reduce visibility, thereby slowing escape and making one more vulnerable to 
its toxic properties. The third can include any toxic effects encountered by fire fighters during 
overhaul, but it is more usually interpreted as a property issue in situations where smoke 
deposition can affect the behavior of sensitive equipment and circuitry. 
FIRE AND LIFE SAFETY EVALUATION OF CHRISTOPHER COHAN CENTER 82 
Predicting Behavior of Fire in the Stage  
This section discusses the dynamics of fire in the stage through the application of 
fundamental principles and state-of-the-art computer based fire simulation models.  
Design fire scenario 
An assembly occupancy-specific fire representative of a typical stage fire is selected as a 
design fire scenario. It explicitly accounts for the following: 
Occupant activities  
Occupants are classified as (1) performers, (2) patrons, (3) ushers and (4) technical crews. 
It can be assumed that the performers are focused on executing performance and the patrons are 
involved in experiencing the performance at the stage (Figure 32). Ushers are volunteers serving 
the front-of-house needs of the Performing Arts Center. In the event of an alarm, they are 
required to assist in evacuation. Technical crews are occupants, who are executing the technical 
requirements of the performance. It can be assumed that the patrons and performers may not 
have a comprehensive conception of the egress arrangement of the building and will be 
dependent on the ushers and in-house technical crews for assistance in evacuating due to 
emergency. 
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Figure 32. A stage performance in progress showing the audience and performers. 
Number and location of occupants 
For the fire scenario number of occupants is assumed to be 2,651 out of which 1,289 are 
patrons seated in the Sidney Herman Hall, 1,289 occupants are assumed waiting in the entry 
lobby to watch the next show, 41 performers in the stage, 15 occupants are assumed as technical 
crews located at different levels of the fly gallery and grid iron and 32 occupants at the cat-walk 
(Figure 33).  
Room size 
The size of the stage is modeled as 30 m. x 12.65 m. x 25 m. The hall is modeled as 30 
m. x 35 m. 19 m. in the zone model. In CFD model, the shape of the hall is modeled as ovular 
fitted inside volume measuring the same as the zone model. 
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Figure 33. A cut-out 3D view of the geometry showing the occupants at different location in the model. 
Contents and furnishings 
The following materials are used in modeling the compartment linings;  
Component Material Conductivity 
(W/m-K) 
Specific 
Heat 
(kJ/kg-K) 
Density 
(kg/m3) 
Thickness 
(m) 
Emissivity 
Stage floor Wood 0.15 2.6 700 0.05 0.9 
Walls Concrete 1.35 0.815 2,250 0.3 0.9 
Hall floor Carpet 0.24  1.87 1,170 0.025 0.9 
 
 Fuel properties and ignition sources:  
Ignition source is assumed to be electrical or lighting equipment igniting drapes, stage 
curtains, which are mostly made of cotton and polyester. The fuel is also assumed to be 
composed of cellulosic and other petrochemical materials. Cellulosic materials include wood, 
MDF, particle boards, ply-wood and so on. Petrochemical materials, in general, refer to plastics 
used to create customized sets and scenery by the process of thermoforming. Some of these 
materials contain styrene, Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene (ABS), Polyethylene terephthalate 
(PETG) and Polycarbonate. The fuel properties are conceived as an average heat of combustion 
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value for these materials and a higher CO and soot yield value for well-ventilated fire scenario. 
The following values are selected for modeling the design fire scenario.  
Heat of combustion: 28,000 kJ/kg 
Soot yield: 0.1 g/g of air 
CO yield: 0.034 g/g of air 
 Ventilation conditions 
 Gravity vents are located near the center and at the highest point above the stage. The 
gravity vents and fire protection curtain are activated by fusible links with RTI of 240 (m/s)1/2 
and melting temperature of 74 C, which are standard values for UL-listed fusible links. The total 
gravity vent area is approximately 224 square feet.  
Duct smoke detectors are installed in the return and supply ducts of HVAC system in 
Christopher Cohan Center to prevent smoke from fire being spread throughout the building by its 
recirculating HVAC system. The detection of duct smoke is difficult for a number reasons. First, 
the location of the return air duct is under the stage which makes it difficult for products of 
combustion to be detected by the duct detectors if the fire is above the stage. And, the dilution 
with return air from other spaces e.g. dressing rooms and possibly with outside fresh air makes 
the modeling of detection difficult. For this reason, HVAC system was not considered in the 
modeling. 
Identification of the first item ignited and its location 
The first item to be ignited is one of the stage curtain located at the back stage. The 
location of the fire is 6 m. from the proscenium wall and 7.5 m from the wall in the west side of 
the stage. 
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Figure 34. Smoke View rendering showing the location of fire at 100 s. 
Rate of growth 
A t-squared fire can be characterized for the design fire scenario by the following 
equation. 
?̇?𝑄 = 𝛼𝛼𝑜𝑜2 
Where 
?̇?𝑄 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁 
𝛼𝛼 = 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜ℎ 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 = 0.05 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝑠𝑠2
 [rounded from 0.0469 which accounts for a fast-
growing fire].  
𝑜𝑜 = 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 
The peak HRR can be considered as HRR needed for flashover which is dependent on the 
openings of the proscenium stage and can be generally predicted using the following equations.  
𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠′𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠: ?̇?𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 750𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓�𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 
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𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠′𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠: ?̇?𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 7.8𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 + 378𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂�𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 
Where 
𝐴𝐴0 = 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑 = 1188𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 + 8 ∗ 32𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 = 134 𝑁𝑁2 
𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑 = 26 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. = 8 𝑁𝑁 
𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑 𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠= 2 ∗ (98 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ∗  42 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 +  98 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ∗  80 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 +  42 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ∗  80 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)  −  1444 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2= 29,188 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2 = 2712 𝑁𝑁2 
?̇?𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 750 ∗ 134 𝑁𝑁2 ∗ √8 𝑁𝑁. = 284,257 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁 7.8 ∗ 2712 𝑁𝑁2 + 378 ∗ 134 𝑁𝑁 ∗ √8 𝑁𝑁= 164,419 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 
Fire Models 
FDS is used to model this fire scenario along with Fire Dynamics Spreadsheet and 
CFAST zone model. FDS allows for “Direct Numerical Simulation” or “Large Eddy Simulations 
(LES)” of fire effects. LES uses a low Mach number approximation for the Navier-Stokes 
equations and a formulation of the complex governing equations to provide a very efficient 
solution. Under the LES mode, the inputs parameters of the fire are heat release rate and species 
generation. Although FDS includes algorithms for flame spread, burning rate, and suppression, 
these have not been developed and validated to allow their application to problems in these areas. 
FDS calculates the temperature, pressure, species concentrations, and flow field in relation to the 
prescribed fire. FDS provides for calculating the activation of sprinklers. In addition, the 
sprinklers can dispense droplets, which yield evaporative cooling and prewetting. The model 
supports prediction of multiple sprinkler activations. The major geometric limitation of FDS is 
its exclusive use of rectilinear computational meshes, which effectively limits the model to “stair 
stepped” approximations for curved or sloped geometries. Although there are commercial CFD 
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packages that allow better definition of realistic geometries, these are much less efficient and 
there has been limited validation of commercial CFD codes for use in fire applications. Heat 
transfer is treated as one-dimensional and is calculated by using thermally thick elements only, 
but heat is not conducted through wall portions to other parts of the domain. The model also 
supports heat-activated vents that “open,” allowing flow through the vent. Smokeview is the 
companion software that is designed to visualize the numerical predictions generated by FDS. 
Modelling the fire 
Instead of modeling by specifying relevant properties via the MATL namelist group, the 
fire of a given heat release rate (HRR) is specified. The speciﬁed ﬁre is basically modeled as the 
ejection of gaseous fuel from a surface of the set and scenery. This is essentially a burner, with a 
speciﬁed Heat Release Rate Per Unit Area, HRRPUA, in units of kW/m2. 
&SURF ID='FIRE', HRRPUA=50. / 
applies 50 kW/m2 to the surface with the attribute SURF_ID=’FIRE’. 
To simulate the fire growth through sets and scenery, the planar surfaces are fragmented, 
and individual fragment has been provided with different ignition time. To prescribe the initial 
fire, heat release rate ramp, the TAU_Q parameter is deﬁned as a negative value (t-squared 
growth rate), which results in a time-dependent heat release rate as 
?̇?𝑄(𝑜𝑜) = ?̇?𝑄𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏)2 if TAU_Q is negative 
Here 𝑄𝑄0̇ is the heat release rate. As the ﬁre ramps up following a t-squared curve, then it 
remains constant after TAU_Q seconds. The subsequent fires are deﬁned as RAMP_T equal to a 
character string designating the ramp function to use for that surface type. Nine subsequent fires 
with different ignition time and heat release rate ramps are specified to different fragments of the 
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vertical stage curtains to model the full duration of the fire and sequential fire spread along the 
stage curtains. 
1. &SURF ID='Burning Curtain 1', COLOR='BLACK', HRRPUA=50.0, TAU_Q=-
100.0/ 
2. &RAMP ID='Burning curtain 2_RAMP_Q', T=100.0, F=0.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burning curtain 2_RAMP_Q', T=173.0, F=1.0/ 
3. &RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 3_RAMP_Q', T=173.0, F=0.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 3_RAMP_Q', T=224.0, F=1.0/ 
4. &RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 4_RAMP_Q', T=224.0, F=0.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 4_RAMP_Q', T=265.0, F=1.0/ 
5. &RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 5_RAMP_Q', T=265.0, F=0.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 5_RAMP_Q', T=330.0, F=1.0/ 
6. &RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 6_RAMP_Q', T=330.0, F=0.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 6_RAMP_Q', T=387.0, F=1.0/ 
7. &RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 7_RAMP_Q', T=387.0, F=0.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 7_RAMP_Q', T=436.0, F=1.0/ 
8. &RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 8_RAMP_Q', T=436.0, F=0.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 8_RAMP_Q', T=480.0, F=1.0/ 
9. &RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 9_RAMP_Q', T=480.0, F=0.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 9_RAMP_Q', T=557.0, F=1.0/ 
10. &RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 10_RAMP_Q', T=557.0, F=0.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burning Curtain 10_RAMP_Q', T=625.0, F=1.0/ 
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The resultant fire growth rate curves are shown in Figure 35. The fire reaches 1 MW 
within 141 s., which is a characteristic of fast growing fire. And continues to grow exponentially 
following a t-squared growth rate.     
 
Figure 35. Heat Release Rate curve attained in the spreadsheet, CFAST and FDS. 
Results 
Figures 36-40 demonstrate the type of approximation that are expected. Results from two 
different models and empirical correlations are used to produce the behavior of the fire in the 
stage. Although the type of approximation produced by the FDS model is more accurate than 
other methods of estimation, the results must still be recognized as engineering approximations. 
In Figure 36, the curves using yellow plots the average upper layer temperature computed from 
FDS model. The other curves graph the predictions by a zone model and a Fire Dynamics 
Spreadsheet. In the case of this simulation, the FDS model followed the same growth curve as 
the spreadsheet calculation until the activation event of the gravity vents at 349 s., but the zone 
model gave a lower prediction of temperature and did not show any sprinkler, gravity vent and 
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fire protection curtain activation events. All the models used to produce the results in Figure 36 
are classified as zone models; that is, they predicted a single “upper layer” (smoke) temperature. 
  
Figure 36. Predicted layer temperature in the stage by Fire Dynamics spreadsheet, zone model (CFAST) and FDS model. 
Figure 37 plots the smoke layer interface calculated by the models. FDS layer device that 
is used to calculate smoke layer interface position, does not recognize any smoke built-up until 
110 s. This is the time when the smoke keeps dissipating until it reaches the end of the ceiling. 
After 110 s., as fire continues to grow, the smoke-layer interface plunges rapidly. The smoke 
interface reaches within 2 m. above the stage at 520 s. The spreadsheet calculation and the zone 
model both shows a conservative smoke layer descend, reaching 2 m. above the stage at 390 s.  
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Figure 37. Prediction of Smoke Layer in the stage by Fire Dynamics Spreadsheet, zone model (CFAST) and FDS model. 
Figure 38 shows the total mass flow through the gravity vents as calculated by the FDS 
model. The first vent activates at 349 s., followed by others. There were total eight (8) vents on 
the ceiling. Each vent was modelled separately with individual heat detector activation control 
logic. All the vent opened within 436 s. After initial spikes in flow due to pressure differences, 
the flow tends to stabilize. The flow is seen to rescind, into the enclosure, after sprinkler 
activation at 498 s.   
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Figure 38. Prediction of Mass Flow Through Gravity Vents by FDS Model. 
Figure 39 and 40 shows temperature changes and smoke layer descend in the seating hall. 
Only the zone model and FDS was used to model the fire environment inside the seating hall. 
Zone model predicts smoke spilling and flow into the compartment at early stage of the fire, 
starting from 150 s. Three separate layer devices, namely Layer 1, Layer 2 and Layer 3 were 
used in FDS to understand the complete scenario. Data from these three devices are shown in 
Figure 39 and 40. Layer 1 and Layer 2 are situated at 2-m. and 15 m. distance from the 
proscenium opening. Layer 3 is located at the farthest end of the seating hall. Layer 1 detects 
smoke spilling through the proscenium opening at the onset of 310 s. First discontinuation of 
smoke flow is observed after 340 s. It can be assumed that the operation of gravity vents changes 
the pressure profile, which changes the direction of the smoke flow. As the heat release rate 
increases, second wave of smoke is seen to spill to the auditorium, which eventually gets 
discontinued by operation of fire protection curtain at 440 s.        
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Figure 39. Predicted layer temperature by zone model versus FDS model inside Harman Hall. 
From Figure 40, the smoke layer descended within 6 m. above the stage level seating at 
500 s, as seen from the data collected by Layer 1. Layer 3 which lies at the end of the hall room 
does not show any formation of smoke layer, which possibly can be a modelling error.      
 
Figure 40. Prediction of smoke layer in the Harman Hall by zone model versus CFD model. 
When using models for analyzing the dynamics of the fire, it is important to be aware of 
the differences between underlying assumptions and limitations of the models that governs the 
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fire effects. As the zone model under predicts the temperature of the hot gas layer at the ceiling, 
the estimated time of operation of the gravity vents, safety curtain and the sprinklers are delayed 
compared to the FDS model. This delay gives the impression of a delayed warning what is 
observed in the FDS model. In the FDS model, all the gravity vents activated between 349 and 
436 seconds, fire protection curtain activated at 440 s. and first sprinkler activated at 498 second. 
On the other hand, zone model predicts the smoke layer to reach 2 m. above the top aisle of the 
gallery level at 210 s. FDS model does not predict smoke layer descend within 2 m. above any 
means of egress, within the simulation time (570 s.). Although in FDS model, the smoke is 
observed to spill in to the hall through the proscenium opening right after 300 s. until the fire 
protection curtain is activated at 440 s.   
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Evacuation 
This section discusses, the emergency management protocol maintained by the 
management of Performing Arts Center to interact with fire conditions in the Christopher Cohan 
Center. Also, evacuation times are calculated through the application of fundamental principles 
of people movement and state-of-the-art computer-based evacuation models. 
Human interaction with fire condition 
In the event of an alarm, Ushers are required to return immediately to their original post 
and await further instructions. The floor captain would signal them if the alarm is false or a true 
emergency. If the evacuation is halted, a general announcement would be made over the public-
address system or from the stage and the event will continue. 
Normal Evacuation Route  
Main Lobby Ushers are required to immediately return to assist in the opening of all 
Main Lobby doors. All patrons would exit through the same doors that they entered through and 
leave the facility through the main lobby doors.  
Once the patrons have exited the building, the Ushers would direct them away from the 
building so they do not block the doors or prevent emergency personnel or vehicles from 
entering the Center.  Even if this is not an emergency, the Fire Department would still report to 
the location and they are required to not have patrons blocking their access to the building. When 
emergency personnel determine, it is safe to re-enter the building, the House Manager would let 
the ushers and patrons know if the performance would continue or be cancelled. 
If this is a true alarm, the Ushers are required to check their designated exit route.  If 
there is no obvious threat (smoke, flames or debris) they should proceed with the normal 
evacuation route (Figure 41). 
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Figure 41. Entry Lobby level plan showing the normal evacuation route. 
Alternate Evacuation Route 
If the Ushers’ exit route is blocked or otherwise congested, they would direct patrons to 
an alternate path (Figure 42). Patrons seated in the orchestra section would exit through the side 
doors and be guided toward the back-stage area and through the closest exit doors to outside of 
the building. Patrons seated in the Balcony and Gallery areas would be directed down the right 
and left sides to the Exit doors leading to the stairwells or the Balcony or Gallery lobby 
emergency stairwells on House Left. 
No one can use the stage as an escape route. Patrons are directed away from stage to 
avoid injury. 
“House right Orchestra” patrons and “Dress Circle right” patrons would proceed through 
the doors leading to the backstage, past the Pavilion.  The exit paths are well marked with wall 
signs and a fluorescent stripe along the lower wall. They would exit the building through the exit 
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doors next to the classroom.  Once patrons have left the building, Ushers would direct them to 
the grass area outside of the Spanos Theatre. 
“House left orchestra” and “Dress Circle left” patrons would exit through the doors 
leading to backstage closest to the Green Room.  Patrons would travel up a few steps to exit 
doors on left. These doors open to loading dock area. Once patrons have left the building, the 
Ushers would direct them to the sidewalk along Tahoe Road around the Music Department 
Building. 
Patrons seated in the Balcony and Gallery levels would be guided toward the exit doors 
leading to the backstage stairwells. Once these patrons have left the building, Ushers would 
direct them to the sidewalk along Tahoe Road via the loading dock area or if they exit through 
the classroom doors, to the grass area outside Spanos Theatre. Dress Circle patrons would need 
to exit through original entry doors but may be guided down stairway to back exits or to the 
emergency stairway on House Left near the Catering area if Main Lobby doors are blocked.  
Patrons with special needs would be escorted to the designated “sanctuary” area near the 
elevator on each level. If possible, they would remain with them until they can be safely 
removed.  
Under certain circumstances, patrons in wheelchairs in the orchestra level would be 
escorted through the lower lobby into the Men’s restroom and out through the Pavilion exit 
doors. The technical crew would evacuate performers on stage, in the dressing rooms and Green 
Room per their plan. 
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Figure 42. Alternate route for evacuation. Blue lines are showing the evacuation route for patrons in wheel-chair. 
Ushers do not fight the fire, if the fire is spreading beyond the spot where it started, or if 
the fire could block their exit or if they aren’t sure how to operate the fire extinguisher. Usher’s 
may fight the fire if they have alerted the Floor Captain and the House Manager has been 
notified to call the Fire Department 911 and patrons are out of the area. If the fire is small and 
they can fight it with their back to an exit and if the fire extinguisher works properly and they 
know how to use it and they know enough to get out fast if their effort is failing. 
Evacuation time calculation 
Evacuation times are calculated through the application of fundamental principles of 
people movement and state-of-the-art computer-based evacuation models. 
Principles of people movement 
The evacuation time for an individual is the entire span of time that elapses from the 
ignition of the fire until the occupant emerges from the building or arrives at a location of safety. 
It consists of four components, all of which must be taken into consideration: (1) Time to 
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notification, (2) Reaction time, (3) Pre-evacuation activity time, (4) Travel or movement time. 
The first three components are often grouped together and referred to as “delay time” or 
“premovement time.” 
Evacuation time = Delay time + Travel time 
= Time to notification + Reaction time + Pre-evacuation activity time + Travel time 
It is very important not to underestimate the contribution that the delay time can make to 
total evacuation time. Studies have shown that, the response in an assembly building could be 
expected to be slow, and in some instances, occupants may completely ignore the signal and 
pursue their activities. Therefore, the selection, estimation, and calculation of premovement 
times is extremely important to obtain valid results. 
Time to Notification. In the evaluation of Christopher Cohan Center, evacuation time 
begins when ignition occurs. Some period, the time to notification, will elapse before conditions 
develop to the point where an alarm sounds or where people begin to sense the cues of the fire 
itself. The fire cues that reach occupants can be the site or smell of smoke, heat, the sight of 
flames, or the sound of an alarm signal from a smoke detector, a duct detector, a heat detector, 
the fire curtain or a sprinkler system. The time to notification is modeled, and is estimated using 
judgment. 
Fire growth and smoke transport models are used with detector/sprinkler activation 
models to estimate this period. Models that are used are DETACT, which models fire curtain and 
sprinkler activation and FDS (Fire Dynamics Simulator), which predicts the transport of heat and 
smoke from the fire. 
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Per the DETACT model, fire curtain and sprinkler is estimated to be activated at 370 and 
490 s respectively. FDS predicts the smoke detector, fire curtain and sprinkler to be activated at 
274, 439 and 498 seconds, respectively. 
The fire cues such as site or smell of smoke and the sight of flames can be sensed by the 
occupants if they are adjacent to the fire source. If the fire is obscured, abrupt change in the 
environment such as, temperature rise, smoke layer descending, change in air pressure and 
velocity etc. might act as notification cues. Figure 43 and 44 shows such an event when the 
smoke layer descends 10 m. from the ceiling to the upper level of fly gallery from 110 s. to130 s. 
This change possibly can shade or obscure lighting effects that are dropped from the grid-iron, or 
if occupants are present in the fly gallery, they would be able to sense the presence of smoke.  
 
Figure 43. Section through Sydney Harman Hall showing soot visibility condition at 100 s after ignition. 
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Figure 44. Section through Sydney Harman Hall showing soot visibility condition at 130 s after ignition. 
Reaction Time. Reaction time is the time it takes an occupant to perceive the alarm or 
fire cue and decide to act. In the event of an alarm, Ushers are required to return immediately to 
their original post and await further instructions. The floor captain would signal them if the alarm 
is false or a true emergency. It will take some period for the person to walk to their post, to 
identify the sound as the smoke alarm, and to wait for further instructions. There is currently no 
generally accepted modeling technique available to predict reaction time. The time used in an 
analysis may depend on observations or judgment. 
Pre-Evacuation Activity Time. Pre-evacuation activity time includes the time that 
elapses while the occupant is preparing to leave or seek refuge. Pre-evacuation activities involve 
all the activities in which an occupant will engage from the time when he or she makes the 
decision to leave until the time he or she starts to travel toward an exit or an area of refuge. 
Ushers might take the time to deliver proper direction to the patrons. As with reaction time, there 
are no generally accepted modeling techniques available for pre-evacuation activity time, and the 
time used in an analysis may depend on observations or judgment.  
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Reaction time and pre-evacuation activity time are often considered together. Combined 
time from notification to the time that movement toward the exit begins can be estimated by the 
data on pre-evacuation delays that have been obtained from postfire behavior studies and 
evacuation drills presented in NFPA Fire Protection Handbook. The short delay times observed 
in the two office building evacuation drills demonstrated the combined effect of “good” alarms, 
training of occupants, and the use of fire wardens to assist in the evacuation. The delay times in 
the two drills averaged 0.60 minute and 1.05 minutes. The lower of these two data is used for the 
current analysis, which is 36 s. The pre-evacuation movement time is a total of 130 + 36 = 166 s. 
Figure 45 shows, the smoke layer formation above the stage and containment by the proscenium 
wall. 
 
Figure 45. Section through Sydney Harman Hall showing soot visibility condition at 166 s. 
Travel Time. Travel time is the final component in the calculation of evacuation time. It 
is defined here as the time to move to a location of safety. There are various calculation or 
estimation techniques available for travel time based on some of the hand calculation methods 
described in the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook. 
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Behavioral simulation models. Behavioral simulation models consider more of the 
variables related to occupant movement and behavior. They treat occupants as individuals with 
unique characteristics. Occupants can move at different speeds in reaction to the conditions in 
their surroundings. Because they are tracked individually, their exposure and reaction to toxic 
conditions while evacuating can be estimated by the model or by tenability or toxicity models 
that analyze the simulation results. This type of model allows a more realistic simulation, but 
there are concerns with their use related to the lack of available data that would allow the 
prediction of human behavior in fire.  
The evaluation of Christopher Cohan Center requires, a comparison of the fire effects 
predicted for the scenario with the results of the evacuation model that would predict where and 
for how long people are dispersed throughout the building. The occupants’ potential exposure to 
the effects of the fire would determine whether the condition is acceptable. 
Behavioral Simulation Model Pathfinder uses the PLOT3D data output from FDS to 
create time history data for each occupant as they move throughout the simulation. FDS 
PLOT3D output data is collected for CO Volume Fraction, CO2 Volume Fraction, and O2 Volume 
Fraction; Pathfinder also output FED for each occupant specified.   
FDS data integration is a measurement only and does not alter the movements or decision 
making within the Pathfinder simulation. The figures below show the calculated FED for 
selected occupants starting from initiation of fire until their exit. For each level, the occupants 
located farthest from their nearest exit are selected, assuming it would result in the highest FED 
due to the prolonged exposure to the fire environment. 
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Figure 46. FED (total) calculated in Behavior Simulation model for occupants located in different levels of the stage. 
 
Figure 47. FED calculated in Behavioral Simulation Model Pathfinder for occupants located at different levels of the Sydney 
Harman Hall. 
Calculation of Factional Effective Dose. The Pathfinder calculation of Fractional 
Effective Dose (FED) uses the equations described in the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection 
Engineering, 5th Edition, Vol 3, Chapter 63, pages 2308-2428. The implementation is the same 
as used in FDS+EVAC, using only the concentrations of the narcotic gases CO, CO2, and O2 to 
calculate the FED value. 
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𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂2 
This calculation does not include the effect of hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and the effect of 
CO2 is only due to hyperventilation. Carbon dioxide does not have toxic effects at concentrations 
of up to 5 per cent, but it stimulates breathing which increases the rate at which the other fire 
products are taken up. 
The fraction of an incapacitating dose of CO is calculated as: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 = 3.17 ∗ 10−5[𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶]1.036(𝑉𝑉)(𝑜𝑜)/𝐹𝐹 
where:  
[CO] = Carbon monoxide concentration (ppm v/v 20° C)  
V = Volume of air breathed each minute (L/min). Value is 25 L/min for an activity level 
of light work – walking to escape.  
t = Time (minutes)  
D = Exposure dose (percent COHb). Value is 30% for an activity level of light work 
(walking to escape).  
Hyperventilation due to carbon dioxide can increase the rate at which other toxic fire  
products are taken up. The multiplication factor is given by: 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 = exp(0.1903 ∗ %𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 + 2.0004) /7.1 
where:  
%CO2 = volume fraction of CO2 (v/v)  
The fraction of an incapacitating dose of low O2 hypoxia is calculated for oxygen volume 
fractions less than 20.9% as: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂2 = 𝑜𝑜exp [8.13 − 0.54(20.9 − %𝐶𝐶2)] 
Where: 
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T = Time (minutes) 
%O2 = volume fraction of O2 (v/v) 
As FEDO2 is time dependent, for a constant value of O2 volume fraction under 0.209 with 
each time step the FEDtot increases at a steady rate, hence resulting a straight curve as seen in 
figure 11. The deviation from a straight curve as seen in Figure 46 for grid irons and fly galleries 
suggests exposure to increased CO and CO2 and reduced O2 concentration in the air. For the 
occupant egressing from the grid-iron level this condition is observed starting from 80 s.   
  FEDtot values of 1.0 is associated with sub-lethal effects that would incapacitate persons 
of average susceptibility. In the absence, of information to the contrary, a log-normal distribution 
of human responses is a reasonable choice, with FED value of 1.0 corresponding to the median 
value of the distribution. Statistics show that at FED criteria of 0.3, 11.4 percent of the 
population would be susceptible to less severe exposures and, therefore, be statistically subject to 
incapacitation. The occupant exiting from the grid-iron level has been exposed to an FEDtot value 
of 0.03.  
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Evaluation Summary 
The summary of fire and life safety evaluations for Christopher Cohan Center is provided 
in this section. 
Objective: Limiting the threat from stage fires to an audience 
Christopher Cohan Center was built in accordance with California Building Code (1992 
Edition) and California Fire Code (1992 Edition). These codes recognize hazards associated with 
the stage including combustible scenery and lighting, scenic elements, contents and acoustical 
treatment on the back and sides of the stage; technical production areas including dressing rooms 
and storage areas. Protection requirements set forth in IBC is intended to limit the threat from 
stage fires to an audience and reduce the likelihood of a large fire in the stage area. 
Christopher Cohan Center is constructed of Type IB construction with sprinkler system. 
The finish floor of the stage is of wood on a resilient mounting upon heavy timbers which 
conforms to Section 410.3. Legitimate stage is completely separated from seating by a 
proscenium wall of 2-hour fire-rated construction with the main proscenium opening protected 
by an automatic closing fire protection curtain in accordance with IBC 410.3.5. 
A fast-growing fire is modeled in FDS which shows activation event of the gravity vents 
at 349 s. Though the zone model gave lower prediction of temperature and did not show any 
sprinkler activation, gravity vent and safety curtain activation occurred. The zone model gives an 
impression of delayed warning than observed in FDS model, where all the gravity vents 
activated between 349 and 436 seconds, fire protection curtain activated at 440 s. and first 
sprinkler activated at 498 second. On the other hand, as the time for the smoke layer to descend, 
2 m above the top aisle of the gallery level being evaluated, the tenability criterion is predicted to 
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occur earlier (210 s) in the zone model than is predicted to occur in the FDS model (not less than 
570 s) though the smoke is seen spilling through the proscenium opening after 300 s.   
Based on this analysis it can be assumed that the stage construction and separation plays 
a key-role in limiting the threat from a stage-fire to the audience due to its containment of smoke 
long enough for the audience to evacuate the hall.    
Objective: Reducing the likelihood of a large fire in the stage area 
A wet pipe, hydraulically calculated automatic sprinkler system is provided throughout 
the building. A hydraulic calculation was performed in accordance with NFPA 13, which shows 
that, the city water supply is not adequate for the sprinkler system and hose stream demands. 
Central station monitoring is provided for all valve supervision and water flow detection devices. 
Class II standpipe are located on each side of the stage. 
The alarm system receives alarm signals from manual pull stations, automatic sprinkler 
water flow indicators, automatic smoke detectors and automatic heat detectors. The activation of 
any alarm signal automatically activates the voice alarm system. The detectors located at the 
lobby area of the Gallery level does not conform NFPA 72 section 17.7.3.4. The current layout of 
the visible notification appliances does not satisfy requirements of NFPA 72 and warrants 
additional visible appliances to be located. 
Fire growth and smoke transport models are used with detector/sprinkler activation 
models to estimate time to notification period. FDS predicts the smoke detector, fire curtain and 
sprinkler to be activated at 274, 439, and 498 seconds, respectively. The rapid descend of smoke 
layer possibly can shade or obscure lighting effects that are dropped from the grid-iron, or if 
occupants are present in the fly gallery, they would be able to sense the presence of smoke 
initiating the notification of the fire event. 
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From the analysis, it can be assumed that the installed systems will not perform well to 
meet the performance criteria. The building would be relying on human actions to detect fire, to 
annunciate and suppress the fire. To reduce the likelihood of a large fire in the stage area human 
intervention would be a crucial factor. 
 Objective: Reduce possibility of irrational mass response 
Christopher Cohan Center is typically occupied by a significant number of people who 
are not completely familiar with their surroundings. The provisions of International Building 
Code section 907 addresses situations regarding the application of the alarm requirements which 
applies for this building. It allows the omission of manual fire alarm boxes in Christopher Cohan 
Center, which is equipped throughout with automatic sprinkler system. The exception permits the 
alarm system to be initiated automatically by the sprinkler water flow switches instead of by the 
manual fire alarm boxes, to reduce the possibility of mischievous or malicious false alarms. To 
afford authorized personnel, the ability to selectively evacuate or manage occupant relocation, 
IBC section 907.2.1.1 requires the fire alarm system to operate through an emergency 
voice/alarm communications system. 
IBC section 1029 deals with egress in Group A occupancies. Performance objective of 
this code is to reduce the possibility of irrational mass response to a perceived emergency. In 
every case, the main entrance and all other exits are to be constantly available for the entire 
building occupant load. Spaces where ques may form should not interfere with established paths 
of egress from the assembly areas. Section 1029 also requires that at least one path of travel is 
always available and occupants face a minimum number of hazards. The primary concern for 
occupant safety would be that, there would not be a bottleneck in the path of travel for means of 
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egress. Lastly, the smoke level is required to be maintained at least 6 feet above the floor of the 
means of egress. 
The main exit of the Sydney Harman Hall accommodates a total occupant load of 1,440, 
which is more than the total occupant load of the hall which is 1,289 complying with IBC section 
1029.2. In addition to having access to a main exit, Christopher Cohan Center is provided with 
additional exit stairs from balcony and gallery levels and additional exits from orchestra stage 
and entry lobby levels that provides egress capacity of 5,280 persons from orchestra stage and 
entry lobby levels and 960 persons from balcony and gallery levels which are more than the total 
occupant loads served by an individual level. Exits from the stage opens directly to exit 
passageways leading to public ways. Both balcony and gallery have two exits which leads 
directly to enclosed exit stairs. 
In the event of an alarm, Christopher Cohan Center Ushers are required to assist in 
evacuation process. All patrons are expected to exit through the same doors that they entered 
through and leave the facility through the main lobby doors. Once the patrons have exited the 
building, the Ushers would direct them away from the building so they do not block the doors or 
prevent emergency personnel or vehicles from entering the Center. If there is no obvious threat 
the occupants should proceed with the normal evacuation route. 
If the Ushers’ exit route is blocked or otherwise congested, they would direct patrons to 
an alternate path. No one would be allowed to use the stage as an escape route. “House right 
Orchestra” patrons and “Dress Circle right” patrons would proceed through the doors leading to 
the backstage, past the Pavilion. “House left orchestra” and “Dress Circle left” patrons would 
exit through the doors leading to backstage closest to the Green Room. Patrons seated in the 
Balcony and Gallery levels would be guided toward the exit doors leading to the backstage 
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stairwells. Patrons with special needs would be escorted to the designated “sanctuary” area near 
the elevator on each level. Under certain circumstances, patrons in wheelchairs in the orchestra 
level would be escorted through the lower lobby into the Men’s restroom and out through the 
Pavilion exit doors. Ushers would not fight the fire, if the fire is spreading beyond the spot where 
it started, or if the fire could block their exit or if they aren’t sure how to operate the fire 
extinguisher.  
The Pathfinder calculation of Fractional Effective Dose (FED) shows that the occupant 
egressing from the grid-iron level are exposed to increased CO and CO2 and reduced O2 
environment starting from 80 s. At the end of evacuation process the occupant has been exposed 
to an FEDtot value of 0.03, which is lower than the values considered as threshold for 
susceptibility to less severe exposure.  
Based on the analysis, it can be assumed, the collective effort of the egress system and 
human-assistance plays a crucial role in evacuation process, which contributes to ensure minimal 
exposure to fire environment. Due to effective evacuation and egress system, possibility of 
irrational mass response is expected to be minimal. 
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Conclusion 
A prescriptive and performance-based fire and life safety evaluation for Christopher 
Cohan Center is performed. The results and findings of the evaluations are conveyed in this 
report. 
Christopher Cohan Center was built in accordance with California Building Code (1992 
Edition) and California Fire Code (1992 Edition). The Current version (2015) of International 
Building Code is consulted for the prescriptive evaluation. The protection requirements set forth 
in IBC are intended to limit the threat from stage fires to an audience, to reduce the likelihood of 
a large fire in the stage area and to reduce the possibility of irrational mass response. These 
objectives have been identified as primary parameters to evaluate the fire and life safety systems 
of the building. 
Christopher Cohan Center was constructed of Type IB construction with a sprinkler 
system throughout the building. Legitimate stage is completely separated from seating by a 
proscenium wall of 2-hour fire-rated construction with the main proscenium opening protected 
by an automatic closing fire protection curtain in accordance with IBC 410.3.5. A wet pipe, 
hydraulically calculated automatic sprinkler system is provided throughout the building. A 
hydraulic calculation was performed in accordance with NFPA 13, which shows that, the city 
water supply is not adequate for the sprinkler system and hose stream demands. The main exit of 
the Sydney Harman Hall accommodates a total occupant load of 1,440, which is more than the 
total occupant load of the hall, 1,289. This arrangement complies with IBC section 1029.2. In 
addition to having access to a main exit, Christopher Cohan Center is provided with additional 
exits from the balcony level, gallery level, orchestra stage, and entry lobby. These exits provide 
an egress capacity of 5,280 persons from orchestra stage and entry lobby levels and 960 persons 
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from balcony and gallery levels, which are more than the total occupant loads served by an 
individual level. In the event of an alarm, Christopher Cohan Center Ushers are required to assist 
in the evacuation process.  
A fast-growing fire is modeled in FDS, which shows activation of gravity vents between 
349 and 436 seconds, fire protection curtain activation at 440 s, and first sprinkler activation at 
498 second after ignition. The tenability criterion is established to be the smoke layer descend 
within 2 m. above any means of egress. This criterion is predicted to occur at 210 s. in the zone 
model. FDS model does not predict smoke layer to descend within 2 m. above any means of 
egress, within the simulation time (570 s.). FDS model also shows that, the proscenium structure 
can contain the smoke until 300 s. FDS predicts the smoke detector will activate at 274 second. 
The notification of the fire event is expected to be triggered by the rapid descend of smoke layer, 
possibly shading or obscuring lighting effects dropped from the grid-iron, or by occupants, 
present in the fly gallery, sensing the presence of smoke, can initiate the notification of the fire 
event by activating manual fire alarm, long before the automatic detection devices detect the fire 
cues and initiate activation of the fire alarm.  
Based on the evaluation of the building and stage construction, it is affirmed that the 
stage construction and separation play a key-role in limiting threat from a stage-fire to the 
audience due to its containment of smoke long enough for the audience to evacuate the hall. 
Response time of the sprinklers and smoke-detectors are excessively long, which confirms that 
the automatic systems will not meet the performance objective of limiting likelihood of a large 
fire in the stage area. The building would be relying on human actions to detect fire, to 
annunciate and to suppress the fire. To reduce the likelihood of a large fire in the stage area, 
human intervention would be a crucial factor. Also, the collective effort of the egress system and 
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human-assistance would play a crucial role in the evacuation process, which would contribute to 
ensure minimal exposure to fire environment. Due to effective evacuation and egress system, the 
possibility of irrational mass response is expected to be minimal. 
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Recommendations 
Following recommendations are provided to address the major fire safety issues 
identified in the Christopher Cohan Center.  
• A fire pump needs to be provided in accordance with NFPA 20 and IBC 913. The 
fire pump system must be inspected, tested and maintained and written records 
should be kept on-site, in accordance with NFPA 20.   
• The automatic sprinkler system needs to be inspected, tested and maintained and 
written records must be kept on-site, in accordance with NFPA 25.   
• The Recommended Fire Safety Management Practices must be added to the 
current Emergency Management Protocol, to create a comprehensive guideline 
for fire and life safety.  
• Dedicated fire watch personnel and crowd managers must be engaged during 
events for immediate detection of fire or smoke and safe evacuation from the 
building.  
• All employees and volunteers must receive training on response procedures as 
described in the Recommended Fire Safety Management Practices. 
 
